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This dissertation focuses on explaining causal relationships between corruption and
various economic and political policies and institutions like governmental decentralization
in countries, membership to an international organization like the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and federal regulatory constraints of industries in the United States.
While identifying causality in issues concerning corruption and these above-mentioned
factors is crucial, attaining it credibly is not straightforward. Measurement error and/or
unobserved heterogeneity make a causal analysis challenging. This dissertation, therefore,
attempts to apply state-of-the-art econometric techniques to circumvent the empirical
issues underlying such studies and identify the causal link. Alongside the applications,
this work strives to provide with plausible illustration of each technique in the current
context as relevant to a specific question at hand.
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CHAPTER 1

Governmental Decentralization and Corruption Revisited: Accounting for Potential
Endogeneity

Abstract: The causal effect of governmental decentralization on firm-level corruption is
inconclusive due to the difficulty in obtaining a traditional instrumental variable.
Circumventing the issue by using the Lewbel (2012) identification strategy, we find mild
evidence of political decentralization being endogenous but no support for fiscal
decentralization being endogenous.

1

Introduction
Recent empirical studies on governmental decentralization and corruption

have utilized better data to facilitate relatively finer analyses (Fan et al. 2009). Various
measures, besides fiscal and federal structure, are available as proxies for decentralization
(Treisman, 2002, 2007b; Fan et al., 2009). For corruption, household- and firm-level
surveys are used to obtain experience-based measures, replacing prior data based on the

perceptions of individuals. Experience-based measures are arguably an advancement as
perceptions are likely to be characterized with more measurement error (Treisman,
2007b). Cultural-political-economic factors which tend to lower corruption bias the
perception indices downward from actual corruption experiences (Donchev and Ujhelyi,
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2014). Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010) found a number of biases in the perceptions
of the experts as compared to actual experiences of corruption by the ordinary citizens
for some African countries. Thus, studying the impact of decentralization on direct

corruption experiences has become crucial. Nevertheless, empirical studies have been
unable to credibly identify the causal relation between decentralization and corruption
experiences.
First, decentralization is a complicated, multi-dimensional process; a single,
accurate measure is seemingly unrealistic. Fan et al. (2009, p. 33) state: "Although the
data we use are more detailed and precise than in previous explorations, they are still
likely to contain some measurement error". This is because several diverse factors are
closely associated with decentralization, impacting each other at various levels and
contexts. It is not only difficult to disentangle them, but segregation of each form of
decentralization from the other is unfavorable due to its overlapping features. To
circumvent this problem, Ivanyna and Shah (2011) use a composite index of several
variables, yet could not disregard the chances of measurement error being present.
Moreover, the ‘actual’' government power existing at a local level is not just due to
‘formal’' decentralization, but also ‘informal’' decentralization due to various cultural,
traditional, and historical relics of a country that is beyond control of the central
government. For example, Vu et al. (2014, p. 3) distinguish between "legitimate level of
autonomy" assigned by the central government to subcentral level and "de facto discretion
in subcentral government decision making" and how this difference affects subcentral
government performance. Difficulty for econometricians is that this actual governmental
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decentralization remains unobserved. Instead, we observe the formal decentralization
given at a country level.
Second, omitted variable bias cannot be ruled out. Unobserved determinants
of corruption like quality of politicians, administrative ability of public officials, longstanding traditions of informal institutions, willingness of common people to participate
in politics, etc. may be correlated with decentralization.
Third, reverse causation may be a problem (Arikan, 2004; Fan et al., 2009).
Corrupt bureaucrats can be strong supporters of decentralization since it is more
conducive to extract rent when they interact with people locally. Besides, regional elites
having financial and political incentives encourage decentralization. It provides them with
greater opportunity to control public resources and hold offices. National executives
reinforce their interest if they have electoral benefits to receive in return. Increasing chance
of getting re-elected at the central level by winning regional support, therefore,
incentivizes alliances between local elites and central executives leading to further
promotion of decentralization (Grossman and Lewis, 2014). In such an instance,
corruption causes decentralization. Likewise, an alternate argument is also plausible.
Regional officials may be close enough to local people to work in their favor and maintain
higher accountability than those working at the center. Thus, decentralization gets
supported by honest local bureaucrats with the target of having better governance.
Referring to these possibilities, Fan et al. (2009, p. 33) state: "... the direction of causation
is open to question for all the dimensions of decentralization examined but especially for
the results concerning fiscal decentralization."

3

The traditional way of addressing endogeneity is elusive in this context due
to the difficulty of finding a credible instrumental variable (IV) for decentralization.
Again, Fan et al. (2009, p. 33) state: "Lacking any reasonable instruments for
decentralization, we can suggest plausible interpretations of the patterns in the data but
cannot make confident claims about their causes".
This paper advances on the existing studies by addressing the potential
endogeneity of decentralization using cross-country, firm-level data on corruption from
the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted in 1999-2000. Building on
previous work in Fan et al. (2009), we circumvent the requirement of a traditional IV by
applying the Lewbel (2012) estimation approach. This uses conditional second moments
of the data for identification.
The identification strategy performs reasonably well in the current context;
the results are notable. There is only mild evidence of political decentralization being
endogenous when analyzing bribe amounts, but not bribe frequency. There is no support
for fiscal decentralization being endogenous using either measure of corruption. Also,
unlike political decentralization, fiscal decentralization has a beneficial impact on
(reducing) corruption.

4

2

2.1

Empirical Analysis

Estimation
The model1 is given by
𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑗 + 𝑋𝑗 𝜃1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗 𝜃2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗

(1)

𝐷𝑗 = 𝜋0 + 𝑋𝑗 𝜋1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗 𝜋2 + 𝜂𝑖𝑗 ,

(2)

where 𝐶𝑖𝑗 is the corruption measure of firm i in country j, 𝐷𝑗 indicates the decentralization
measure, 𝑋𝑗 is a vector of country-level covariates, 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is a vector of firm-level covariates,
θ₁, θ₂, π₁, and π₂ are conformable vectors of parameters, and ε and η are mean zero,
possibly correlated error terms.2
The Lewbel (2012) identification requires some of the covariates to be related
with the conditional variance of the first stage error (𝜂𝑖𝑗 ) but unrelated to the conditional
covariance between the first stage (𝜂𝑖𝑗 ) and second stage (𝜀𝑖𝑗 ) errors. Formally, if there
exists z ⊆ X, where 𝑋∈ {𝑋𝑗 , 𝑋𝑖𝑗 }, such that
𝐸[𝑧′𝜂²] ≠ 0

(3)

𝐸[𝑧′𝜀𝜂] = 0,

(4)

then 𝑧̃ ≡ (𝑧 − 𝑧̅)𝜂 are valid instruments.

Note that the ‘true’' model is given by: 𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑗∗ + 𝑋𝑗 𝜃₁ + 𝑋𝑖𝑗 𝜃₂ + 𝜀̅𝑖𝑗 where 𝐷𝑗 = 𝐷𝑖𝑗∗ + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 =
𝜀̅𝑖𝑗 − 𝛽𝜇𝑖𝑗 . 𝐷𝑖𝑗∗ captures the unobserved formal and informal decentralization experienced by firm i in country
j, and𝜇𝑖𝑗 is measurement error.
1

2

Note, the dependent variable in (1) is at the country level, but as is traditional in two-stage models, the
first-stage regressions control for all exogenous variables from the second-stage and is, thus, estimated using
the full sample and controlling for 𝑋𝑖𝑗 .
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To provide some intuition in the current context, consider the following
factor loading error structure:
𝜀𝑖𝑗 ≡ 𝜎𝜀 (𝑧)𝜆𝑖𝑗

(5)

𝜂𝑖𝑗 ≡ 𝜎𝜂 (𝑧)𝜆𝑖𝑗 .

(6)

If 𝜆𝑖𝑗 is a common homoskedastic factor, independent of z, with mean zero and unit
variance and 𝜎𝜀 (𝑧) and 𝜎𝜂 (𝑧) are standard deviations of ε and η, respectively, each
depending on z but independent of 𝜆𝑖𝑗 , then conditions (3) and (4) will be satisfied.3
As an example, consider Indonesia's extensive decentralization in late 1990s.
Upon decentralization, it became apparent that there was an insufficient pool of capable
local agents to organize and administer (International Crisis Group, 2012). Thus,
decentralization resulted in a reduction in the quality of government officials. In the above
error structures, 𝜆𝑖𝑗 may represent the (unobserved) administrative ability of public
officials at the subnational level. The impact of administrative ability on decentralization,
operating through 𝜂𝑖𝑗 , is enhanced or diminished by specific country-level and/or firmlevel attributes captured by 𝜎𝜂 (𝑧). For instance, countries long open to democracy are
likely to experience higher bargaining power among local agents. High ability local agents
in these areas are expected to influence the central level more, leading to more localization
of power. Rich countries with higher GDP per capita tend to have better infrastructure
and resources to allow public administration to run more smoothly at all levels. Areas
having relatively more high skilled officials are expected to use these resources more

3

Actually, (5) is stronger than is necessary. Even if 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is homoskedastic, (3) and (4) will still be satisfied.
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efficiently. Hence, variation in decentralization can be observed across different regions
depending on the economic status of the country. Firms with government ownership in
its financial stake have higher political connections and influences than private firms.
Subnational level officials may be forced to conform to certain political realities when
dealing with such firms. This may reduce their de facto power to administer and execute
regulations. Consequently, the impact of administrative ability may be diminished for
regions with greater share of government owned firms.
If the errors constitute only administrative ability, then the correlation
between ε and η is necessarily positive. An error structure consistent with the Lewbel
(2012) requirements but that does not impose a positive correlation between ε and η is
the following
𝜀𝑖𝑗 ≡ 𝜎𝜀 (𝑧)𝜆𝑖𝑗 𝜖1𝑖𝑗

(7)

𝜂𝑖𝑗 ≡ 𝜎𝜂 (𝑧)𝜆𝑖𝑗 𝜖2𝑖𝑗 .

(8)

where 𝜖1𝑖𝑗 and 𝜖2𝑖𝑗 denote unpredicted shocks - perhaps related to the political
environment -- to corruption and decentralization, respectively. Now the correlation
between ε and η depends on the correlation between 𝜖1𝑖𝑗 and 𝜖2𝑖𝑗 . For conditions (3) and
(4) to hold, the 𝜖𝑖𝑗 s must be independent of z and 𝜆𝑖𝑗 .
To better understand (7) and (8), suppose a country is endowed with a pool
of agents of certain quality, 𝜆𝑖𝑗 , and faces a natural catastrophe. The impact on
subnational revenue (or some other measure of local political power) may be negative due
to an increase in the central government spending (or power) to address the crisis (i.e.,
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𝜖2𝑖𝑗 < 0). In additon, firms and industries may be destroyed. To re-start business, these
firms need to interact with the public officials to get their work done, perhaps with a
priority. So, in order to get preferential treatment, the supply of bribes rises (i.e., 𝜖1𝑖𝑗 >
0). Thus, this shock induces events that affect decentralization and corruption, but in
opposite directions. However, shocks such as this must be independent of firm- and
country-level characteristics and abilities of public officials.
To proceed, we first choose those covariates as 𝑧 variables which are related
to the first stage error variances. For that, we apply the Breusch-Pagan test for
heteroskedasticity and use the estimated 𝜂 to generate instruments 𝑧 within the model.
The structural model is then estimated via GMM. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors are clustered by country to allow for correlation among errors across firms within
a particular country.4

2.2

Data
Corruption data comes from the WBES of 1999-2000. The dependent

variables are Bribe Frequency and Bribe Amount, each representing a separate dimension
of corruption. Summary statistics and description of the variables are presented in Table
1.5

4

We also estimate ordered probit model via control function approach to account for ordered categorical
measure of corruption. The results are imprecise but available upon request.
5

The data set is taken from Daniel Treisman's web site:
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Pages/publishedpapers.html
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Table 1: Summary Statistics and Description of the Variables
Va ri a bl e

N

Mea n

SD

Defi ni tion

Bri be Frequency

9130

2.914

1.683

It i s common for fi rms i n my l i ne of bus i nes s to ha ve to pa y s ome i rregul a r “addi tiona l pa yments ” to get thi ngs done:

Bri be Amount

5246

2.427

1.542

Ti ers

9785

3.898

0.947

(1) never, (2) s el dom, (3) s ometimes , (4) frequently, (5) mos tly, (6) a l wa ys .
On a vera ge, wha t percentage of revenues do fi rms l i ke yours typi ca l l y pa y per yea r i n unoffi ci a l pa yments to publ i c
offi ci a l s : (1) 0%, (2) grea ter tha n 0 a nd l es s tha n 1%, (3) 1–1.99%, (4) 2–9.99%, (5) 10–12%, (6) 13–25%, (7) over 25%.
Number of tiers of government. A tier i s coded a s a “ti er of government” i f s tate executive body a t tha t l evel
(1) wa s funded from the publ i c budget, (2) ha d a uthori ty to a dmi ni s ter a ra nge of publ i c s ervi ces , a nd (3) ha d a
terri tori a l juri s di ction.
Sub-na tiona l Revenues

7877

5.950

5.141

Subna tiona l revenues (% of GDP), a vera ge 1994–2000, a va i l a bl e yea rs , from Worl d Ba nk Decentra l i za tion Indi ca tors ,

Federa l

9785

0.219

0.414

Dummy va ri a bl e tha t takes the va l ue 1 i f the country i s cl a s s i fi ed a s “federa l ”, 0 otherwi s e.

Bottom Uni t Si ze

9114

1.739

8.862

Avera ge s i ze of bottom tier uni ts , thous a nd s q km (i .e., s urfa ce a rea di vi ded by es tima ted number of bottom tier

Forei gn Owners hi p

9673

0.188

0.391

State Owners hi p

9645

0.122

0.327

Exporter

9463

0.356

0.479

Dummy va ri a bl e tha t equa l s 1 i f fi rm exports , 0 otherwi s e.

Fi rm Si ze

9087

9.982

7.803

Na tura l l oga ri thm of fi rm's s a l es .

Indus try Dummi es

9141

2.103

1.238

A s eri es of dummy va ri a bl es tha t repres ent the fi rms ' i ndus tri es (Ma nufa cturi ng, Cons truction, Servi ce, Agri cul ture,

GDP per Ca pi ta

9728

8.447

0.938

Na tura l l oga ri thm of country's GDP per ca pi ta i n yea r 1999.

Democra tic

9785

0.126

0.332

Democra tic i n a l l yea rs 1950–2000.

Fuel

9111

13.973

21.434

% of mi nera l fuel s i n ma nufa cturi ng exports , 2000.

Imports

9685

41.199

19.158

Imports of goods a nd s ervi ces a s % of GDP, 2000.

Protes tant

9932

0.084

0.126

Protes tant a s % of the popul a tion.

Bri tis h Col ony

9683

0.207

0.405

Dummy va ri a bl e tha t takes the va l ue 1 i f the country i s a former Bri tis h col ony, 0 otherwi s e.

cons tructed from IMF GFS.

uni ts ).
Dummy va ri a bl e tha t equa l s 1 i f a ny forei gn compa ny or i ndi vi dua l ha s a fi na nci a l s take i n the owners hi p of the
fi rm, 0 otherwi s e.
Dummy va ri a bl e tha t equa l s 1 i f a ny government a gency or s tate body ha s a fi na nci a l s take i n the owners hi p of the
fi rm, 0 otherwi s e.

a nd Others ).

Notes : Des cri ption of the va ri a bl es a re taken di rectly from Fa n et a l . (2009).

We consider two broad forms of decentralization: political and fiscal
decentralization. Three proxies used for political decentralization are: (i) total number of
administrative and governmental layers (tiers) representing the vertical design of the
government, (ii) Federal structure (as defined by Elazar, 1995) representing the political
structure of power devolution, and (iii) the average size of bottom tier units measuring
the horizontal lay out of power on the lowest rung of the administration. The proxy used
for fiscal decentralization is subnational share of government revenue (as % of GDP).
Each proxy, therefore, represents a specific form of decentralization having its own policy
implication, but most likely with overlapping features. These measures are from the mid1990s. Fan et al. (2009) provides a good review of various theoretical arguments on
different forms of decentralization influencing corruption.
9

We run two sets of regressions (for each of the two corruption measures) on
one decentralization proxy at a time. Using multiple proxies for the primary variable of
interest in the same model results in estimates that are difficult to interpret.6 Note, there
is some asymmetry in the sample across estimations due to missing observations.
Following the previous literature, various firm-level controls are included:
dummy variables for firm ownership, State and Foreign, an Exporter dummy, Firm Size
and Industry Classification. At the country level, the controls are Log of GDP per Capita,

Imports, Democratic, British Colony, Fuel and Protestant.7
3

Results
Main results are presented in Table 2. For brevity, we only report the

coefficients on the decentralization proxies. OLS estimates are presented for comparison.

6

It is in this respect that our basic model differs from that mainly used by Fan et al. (2009). In their paper,
the authors control for the number of tiers in all the regressions estimating the effect of each of the other
decentralization variable. They argue that the way power and resources are distributed across tiers, their
effect on corruption is expected to depend on the number of tiers as well. Though they also run a separate
set of regressions without controlling for tiers, the results mainly reported in the paper are those with
multiple proxies in the same regression.
7

We used additional variables, total government revenue (% of GDP) and total government employment
to control for the government size but the sample changes considerably due to missing observations. Results
are available upon request.
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Table 2: Corruption Measures and Decentralization Variables
Bribe Frequency
Variables
Tiers

Bribe Amount

OLS

GMM

OLS

GMM

0.383*

0.506*

0.493*

0.371†

(0.139)

(0.178)

(0.146)

(0.169)

Underi d Tes t

0.024

0.090

F-s ta t

11.997

7.933

Overi d Tes t

0.323

0.497

Endogenei ty

0.487

0.177

Si g. Endog.

0.008

0.001

0.001

0.059

N

6676

6676

4102

4102

Federal

0.077

0.381

0.208

0.660*

(0.160)

(0.347)

(0.182)

(0.229)

Underi d Tes t

0.007

0.007

F-s ta t

29.190

26.456

Overi d Tes t

0.891

0.950

Endogenei ty

0.315

0.028

Si g. Endog.

0.631

0.533

0.259

0.018

N

6676

6676

4102

4102

-0.013†

-0.038*

-0.124†

-0.126†

(0.005)

(0.008)

(0.051)

(0.052)

Bottom Unit Size
Underi d Tes t

0.057

0.020

F-s ta t

69.573

264.885

Overi d Tes t

0.141

0.517

Endogenei ty

0.190

0.051

Si g. Endog.

0.014

0.012

0.019

0.003

N

6527

6527

4102

4102

Subnational Revenues

-0.033†

-0.054

0.013

-0.008

(0.014)

(0.049)

(0.015)

(0.035)

Underi d Tes t

0.035

0.027

F-s ta t

4.441

38.459

Overi d Tes t

0.155

0.605

Endogenei ty

0.660

0.516

Si g. Endog.

0.021

0.026

0.390

0.856

N

5716

5716

3496

3496

Notes : ‡ p<0.10, † p<0.05, * p<0.01. Heteros keda s ti ci ty-robus t s ta nda rd errors cl us tered by country a re i n
pa renthes es . Control s a re Sta te Owners hi p, Forei gn Owners hi p, Exporter, Fi rm Si ze, GDP per Ca pi ta , Democra ti c,
Fuel , Imports , Protes ta nt, Bri ti s h Col ony a nd Indus try Dummi es . Ins truments ba s ed on: Exporter, GDP per Ca pi ta
(Ti ers , Bri be Frequency); Exporter, Fuel , Protes ta nt (Ti ers , Bri be Amount); Imports , Bri ti s h Col ony (Federa l , Bri be
Frequency); GDP per Ca pi ta , Fuel , Imports (Federa l , Bri be Amount); Fuel , Indus try Dummy (Bottom Uni t Si ze, Bri be
Frequency); Fi rm Si ze, Indus try Dummy (Bottom Uni t Si ze, Bri be Amount); Exporter, Protes ta nt, Indus try Dummy
(Subna ti ona l Revenues , Bri be Frequency); Exporter, Bri ti s h Col ony (Subna ti ona l Revenues , Bri be Amount). Underi d
Tes t reports the p-va l ue of Kl ei bergen Pa a p (2006) rk LM s ta ti s ti c where rejecti on i mpl i es i denti fi ca ti on. F-s ta t
reports the Kl ei bergen-Pa a p rk F-s ta ti s ti c for wea k i denti fi ca ti on. Overi d Tes t reports the p-va l ue Ha ns en J-s ta ti s ti c
where rejecti on ra i s es doubt a bout the i ns truments ' va l i di ty. Endogenei ty reports the p-va l ue of the Endogenei ty
tes t of endogenous decentra l i za ti on regres s or. Si g. Endog. reports the p-va l ue of the Anders on-Rubi n (1949) chi s qua re wea k i ns trument robus t tes t of s i gni fi ca nce of the endogenous regres s or for GMM a nd the s ta nda rd twos i ded p-va l ue for OLS.
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Of the eight cases that are estimated using GMM, instruments pass the
underidentification and overidentification tests in six. The instruments have good
explanatory power in five out of those six since the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is higher
than the standard threshold. The three cases where there is some weak instruments
concern, the Anderson-Rubin (1949) test robust to weak instruments indicates statistical
significance at least at the p < 0.05 confidence level in two and another one at the p <
0.10 confidence level. We interpret these to be evidences in support of the identification
strategy.
Given this, we obtain some interesting findings. First, there is only mild
evidence of political decentralization being endogenous. Specifically, we reject exogeneity
of federalist structure at the p < 0.05 confidence level when corruption is measured in
terms of bribe amount. Controlling for this results into significantly larger positive effect
indicating federalist structure to be conducive for corruption. To be specific, the IV
estimate is almost three times larger than OLS and statistically significant at least at the
p < 0.05 confidence level by both the traditional approach and the Anderson-Rubin weak
instrument robust test. Also, we reject exogeneity of bottom tier units' average size at
the p < 0.10 confidence level for bribe amount. The statistical significance is at the p <
0.01 confidence level once we control for endogeneity. These results imply that countries
with federalist structure and greater horizontal dispersion of power in terms of smaller
lowest level units received bribes in larger amounts.
Second, contrary to usual speculation and unlike political decentralization, we
find

no

evidence

of

endogeneity

for

fiscal decentralization. Moreover, fiscal
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decentralization has some beneficial effect on corruption by reducing bribe frequency. The
effect is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 confidence level.
Theoretically, size of the bottom tier units are positively associated with the
moving cost of mobile capital and consequently to (less) interregional competition
(Tiebout, 1956; Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). This should induce more corruption when
the average size of the lowest level units is larger. Yet, the results here are opposite. We
interpret this as a support for the alternate hypothesis (Cai and Treisman, 2004). Local
governments tend to attract firms that are promised to receive beneficial treatment for
their local businesses upon establishment. Besides, the useful impact of greater fiscal
decentralization on mitigating corruption comes with a potential cost. While giving larger
revenue share may disincentivize the local officers from demanding bribes, there is also a
possibility of greater embezzlement in the official fund to earn additional income if the
opportunity cost to swindle is less.
Since our specifications differ from those primarily reported in Fan et al. (2009),
we exercise restraint from making any ‘direct’' comparison of the results. However, on a
qualitative note, it can be concluded that the signs of the impacts of decentralization
proxies on corruption, in general, are in agreement with those found by Fan et al. (2009).
But, for cases where we find evidence of endogeneity, we often obtain statistically
significant estimates in contrast to Fan et al. (2009).
4

Conclusion
The causal relation between governmental decentralization and firm-level

corruption experience remains an open question because of unobserved heterogeneity
and/or measurement error in decentralization. Recognizing the difficulty of obtaining a
13

traditional instrumental variable, we advance on existing studies by addressing the

potential endogeneity issue in the literature, focusing specifically on Fan et al. (2009).
Using the Lewbel (2012) estimation approach for identification, we find mild evidence of

political decentralization being endogenous. Controlling for this results into a larger
positive effect indicating political decentralization to induce more corruption. The results
here also suggest the economic significance of decentralization to be greater than suggested
by the prior literature. However, we find no support for fiscal decentralization to be
endogenous. This is contrary to standard conjecture. Further, fiscal decentralization helps
to reduce corruption, unlike political decentralization. To the best of our knowledge, this
attempt is first of its kind in this literature. So, though instructive, yet more evidences
are warranted concerning the result.
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CHAPTER 2

WTO Membership and Corruption
Abstract: Despite widespread belief that accession to and membership in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) improves the quality of governance, there is no convincing empirical
evidence. Here, we investigate whether WTO status has a causal e¤ect on firm-level
reports of political corruption using a nonparametric partial identification approach to
bound the average treatment e¤ects (ATEs). We also analyze conditional ATEs to explore
various sources of potential heterogeneity. Contrary to existing thought, we find that
WTO accession and membership are likely to increase corruption. However, the sources
of the increase in corruption di¤er across the two phases.

1

Introduction
An extensive literature investigates how membership in, or even the accession

process to, the World Trade Organization (WTO) or its predecessor, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has impacted country-level trade patterns (e.g.,
Rose 2004). A distinct literature assesses the effect of trade openness (or, liberalization of
trade) on political corruption (e.g., Gatti 2004).8 However, little is known about the direct
causal effect of accession to and membership in the WTO on the level of political

8

Note, literature on trade and corruption often use the terms ‘openness to trade’' and ‘liberalization of
trade’' interchangeably. See, for example, Baksi et al. (2009).
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corruption in a country. This lack of knowledge persists despite increasing recognition of
the importance of institutional quality in explaining heterogeneity in economic growth
and development and the concomitant rise in membership in the WTO and other
international organizations (Acemoglu et al. 2005). Currently, 162 countries are WTO
members, with another 22 having observer status.9
Several international organizations, such as the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), European Union (EU), Organization of American
States (OAS), The Council of Europe, The World Bank (WB), and The International
Monetary Fund (IMF), went through a rapid and widespread process of adoption of anticorruption measures in the 1990s. In contrast, Abbott (2001, p. 278) notes that the WTO
remained "conspicuously absent from the list." However, beginning in 2014, the WTO
addressed corruption in its rules and regulations for the first time through its Agreement
on Government Procurement (GPA).10 The GPA was negotiated between 1997 and 2011,
formally adopted in 2012, and entered into force in 2014. The agreement seeks to increase
transparency and fairness, avoid conflicts of interest, and prevent corrupt behaviors. That
said, only 45 member countries are covered by the GPA.
Despite this recent and partial attempt to address institutional quality in
general and corruption in particular, accession to the WTO has long been hypothesized
to yield indirect benefits such as improved governance, institutional reforms, increased
transparency, and reduced corruption. Along this line, Allee and Scalera (2012, p. 273)

9

10

See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm

See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/20y_e/gpa_brochure2015_e.pdf
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state: "[A]ccession to the WTO and other international organizations might have broader
indirect effects -- such as on domestic political institutions within joiners -- perhaps by
reducing corruption or increasing transparency."
One such channel through which institutional improvements may occur is
via trade liberalization, as noted above. Another channel is via policy anchoring, whereby
accession allows countries to commit to reforms that may otherwise be infeasible. In this
regard, Drabek and Bacchetta (2004, p. 1096) state: "Membership in the WTO should
help reduce incentives for corruption by providing countries with what are perhaps the
most powerful institutional checks and balances in the international economic sphere.
Accession imposes changes both in institutions and policies."
To the extent that the WTO affects political corruption via trade
liberalization, this impact should occur only after membership. However, some researchers
are of the opinion that the process of policy anchoring takes place during the years of

accession.11 To this end, Aaronson and Abouharb (2014, p. 548, 554) identify three "core
values" of the WTO itself that are associated with quality governance: (i) evenhandedness or non-discrimination, (ii) access to information or transparency, and (iii)
administrative due process. As countries adhere to these core values during and after
accession, the authors argue that trade-related governance will improve and the effects
will "gradually spill over into the polity as a whole."
Given this background, in this paper we begin by asking whether
membership in the WTO has a causal effect on political corruption in countries. The

11

See Aaronson and Abouharb (2014) for more details on these arguments.
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importance of answering this question should not be overlooked. In 2013, World Bank
Group President Kim stated that corruption is "public enemy number one." 12 Avis et al.
(2016, p. 1) write: "Politicians throughout the world embezzle billions of dollars each year,
and in so doing induce the misallocation of resources, foster distrust in leaders, and
threaten the very pillars of democracy." While a finding that the WTO has a causal effect
on corruption -- either positive or negative -- is not a reason (on its own) to expand or
contract the WTO, understanding the ramifications of WTO membership on domestic
corruption is crucial as countries tackle corruption. If countries assume that WTO
membership will reduce corruption, yet the opposite turns out to be the case, then
countries will need to strengthen anti-corruption efforts upon WTO membership, not relax
them.
While the question of the causal effect of WTO status on corruption is
critical, answering it is not straightforward for two reasons. First, countries self-select into
the WTO. Drabek and Bacchetta (2004) provide a good review of both theoretical and
practical reasons for why a country might desire to join the WTO. Second, membership
status may be misclassified due to the length of the accession process and the presence of
nonmember participants (Tomz et al. 2007). Moreover, as mentioned above, policy
anchoring may take place during the accession period, before a country actually gains the
formal membership status.13 As a result, while formal membership status is perfectly
observed, some members of the control group (i.e., non-formal members) may actually be

12

See http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/12/19/corruption-developing-countriesworld-bank-group-president-kim.
13

See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/cbt_course_e/c4s1p1_e.htm.
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more similar to the treatment group (i.e., formal members). As deciding which non-formal
members should be placed in the treatment group is perhaps an impossible task, we
instead begin by defining the treatment as formal membership but allow for possible
measurement error in the treatment status.
In this paper, we also ask whether accession to the WTO has a causal effect
on political corruption in order to examine the policy anchoring hypothesis. To do so, we
examine a second treatment, defined as countries that are not formal members of the
WTO during the sample period (discussed later), but become formal members in the
future. The control group contains countries that are not formal members during the
sample period nor at present. Identifying the causal effect of this treatment confronts the
same two econometric challenges that plague the first treatment: self-selection and
misclassification. Self-selection is obvious; misclassification may arise because we do not
know when the process of accession begins for countries that become formal WTO
members at some future date.
To answer these questions, traditional econometric techniques such as fixed
effects and instrumental variables methods are not likely to be viable solutions to these
two econometric challenges for several reasons. First, neither is likely able to address nonclassical measurement error in a binary covariate (Black et al. 2000). Second, WTO
membership is not likely to be strictly exogenous due to reverse causation from political
corruption to membership status. Drabek and Bacchetta (2004, p. 1096-1097) state: "[A]
high level of institutional quality will facilitate the accession while the accession promotes
good institutional quality." Moreover, the parallel trends assumption in difference-in-
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differences model is not likely to hold due to anticipatory effects of membership. Finally,
plausible exclusion restrictions, even in the absence of misclassification, seem unlikely.
To circumvent these econometric challenges, we take a nonparametric
partial identification approach following Kreider et al. (2012) and McCarthy et al.
(2015).14 Thus, our objective is to bound the average treatment effect (ATE) of WTO
status on political corruption, instead of attaining point identification. The benefit of
using a partial identification approach is to explore a range of possible estimates obtained
under different sets of assumptions, instead of imposing stringent (and likely implausible)
assumptions in the current context -- required under panel data or instrumental variables
estimation -- to obtain point identification (Tamer 2010; Manski 2013; Ho and Rosen
2015).
To obtain sharp bounds on the ATEs under different assumptions regarding
the selection process and misclassification of treatment assignment, we use firm-level
corruption data from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES, 1999-2000) which
contains information on the first-hand experiences of firm managers with bribe payments
to public officials.15 Further, we bound conditional ATEs, allowing for the bounds to vary
on the basis of several country- and firm-level characteristics.

14

For application of a similar identification approach when assessing the impact of WTO membership on
participation in multilateral environmental agreements, see Millimet and Roy (2015).
15

We utilize the WBES data for several reasons. First, in contrast to other firm-level corruption data such
as the Enterprise Surveys, the WBES are older (when fewer countries were members of the WTO) and
include more developed countries that are absent from the Enterprise Surveys (e.g., Canada, United States,
and many western European nations). Second, in contrast to country-level corruption indices, firm-level
corruption surveys seem less ad hoc and allow for examination of heterogeneous determinants of corruption
across firms within countries.
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The results are striking. Our primary finding is that membership in the
WTO is likely to increase the frequency of bribes paid by firms. This finding is in stark
contrast to the usual conjecture. Specifically, defining the treatment as formal WTO
membership and using the full sample, the ATE bounds exclude zero in the absence of
misclassification but under otherwise reasonable assumptions. Since formal membership
is observed without error, this implies that (under reasonable assumptions) formal WTO

membership increases corruption in expectation.
In an attempt to understand the mechanisms underlying this result, we
reach two additional conclusions. First, our findings do not appear to be driven by policy
anchoring during the accession period (with a reversion to pre-existing levels of political
corruption upon gaining formal WTO membership). Defining the treatment as future
formal WTO membership (relative to countries that never gain formal WTO
membership), the ATE bounds continue to exclude zero in the absence of misclassification,
indicating an increase in the bribe frequency. Second, the results may be due, at least in
part, to a compositional change in the types of entrepreneurs that choose to enter the
market after the attainment of formal WTO membership. The evidence points to a greater
increase in corruption when the treatment group is restricted to firms that are established
after formal WTO membership.16
We also obtain a host of other intriguing results. First, we cannot rule out
the possibility that the ATE is zero in the full sample once modest levels of
misclassification are allowed. Thus, allowing for some non-formal members to behave more

16

A rise in corruption due to the entry of new entrepreneurs after WTO accession is interesting in light of
the evidence that WTO accession increases trade mainly along the extensive margin (e.g., Dutt et al. 2013).
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similarly to formal members creates uncertainty regarding the direction of the impact of
the WTO on political corruption. Second, the evidence in favor of an increase in bribe
frequency among formal WTO members is stronger for countries having high market entry
regulations for firms (in terms of cost, number of procedures, and time taken to start a
business) and low net outflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). The evidence in favor
of an increase in bribe frequency is also stronger for government owned firms. Finally, the
evidence in favor of an increase in political corruption due to future formal WTO
membership is stronger for countries having high market entry regulations for firms
(measured in terms of time taken to start a business), countries with high net inflows of
FDI and low net outflows of FDI, and non-government owned or exporting firms. As such,
the sources of the increase in political corruption differ during the accession and
membership phases.
In sum, our analysis reveals at best a small, beneficial effect of WTO
accession and membership on reducing corruption if misclassification is permitted;
accession and membership are most likely to exacerbate corruption counter to prevailing
wisdom. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses
the pertinent literature. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology and data. Section
4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
2

Literature Review
The WTO itself claims that membership may "help reduce corruption and

bad government."17 Two mechanisms have been espoused in defense of this claim. First,
membership reduces opportunities for corruption through the liberalization of trade

17

See https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/10b_e.pdf.
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policy. Second, accession leads to policy anchoring, making institutional reforms politically
feasible. We briefly discuss the existing evidence regarding each channel.

2.1

Trade Liberalization
There are two mechanisms by which trade liberalization may causally affect

political corruption. Gatti (2004) refers to them as the direct policy effect and the foreign

competition effect. While the foreign competition effect centers on the consequences of
changes in trade volume, the direct policy effect concerns changes in trade barriers. Note,
the primary objective of the WTO is to reduce tariff and other non-tariff barriers between
trading countries.18 We briefly consider each.
2.1.1

Direct Policy Effect
Theoretically, trade restrictions may encourage collusion between public

officials and domestic firms. Specifically, when trade is artificially restricted by the
domestic government, competition increases among importers attempting to gain market
access (e.g., through the acquisition of an import license). This incentivizes importers to
bribe customs officials to evade quota restrictions and trade taxes (Krueger 1974).
Gatti (2004) tests this empirically using two alternative measures for trade
liberalization: (i) average tariff levels and (ii) percentage of imports subject to a quota
restriction. The author finds tariffs to be positively associated with corruption, even after
controlling for import share. However, the author finds no significant relationship between
non-tariff barriers and corruption. One possible explanation is that the quota restriction
under consideration is not binding. In related work, Gatti (1999) focuses on the variation

18

See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto\_e/whatis\_e/tif\_e/agrm3\_e.htm.
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in tariffs across industries, rather than the average tariff level. Here, the author shows
that if tariff rates are set at a uniform level, instead of optimal (variable) rates, then
opportunities for custom officials to extract rents from importers diminish. Larrain and
Tavares (2004) find empirical support for this theory.
In sum, the extant literature on the direct policy effect leads one to
conjecture that participation in the WTO, through the relaxation of trade barriers,
reduces opportunities for corruption (in the allocation of quotas or tariff protections).19
However, the existing evidence has not established this as a causal relationship.
2.1.2

Foreign Competition Effect
As an economy becomes more open, the ceteris paribus effect is that the

domestic market becomes more competitive due to the increased presence of foreign firms.
This increase in trade volume reduces the level of monopolistic rents available to domestic
firms and, as a consequence, may decrease their ability to offer bribes. Thus, opportunities
for political corruption diminish (Ades and Di Tella 1999).
Empirical tests in Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Treisman (2000)
corroborate this hypothesis. The authors use the share of imports in GDP as a measure
of trade openness and find a negative relationship with corruption. In contrast, Torrez
(2002) finds this relationship to be ambiguous; results depend on the empirical measure

19

The fact that trade barriers have fallen under the WTO is not controversial. For example, Baldwin (2016,
p. 95) states: "When the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was signed by 23 nations in 1947, the
goal was to establish a rules-based world trading system and to facilitate mutually advantageous trade
liberalization. As the GATT evolved over time and morphed into the World Trade Organization in 1993,
both goals have largely been achieved. The WTO presides over a rule-based trading system based on norms
that are almost universally accepted and respected by its 163 members. Tariffs today are below 5 percent
on most trade, and zero for a very large share of imports." Brown (2004) provides empirical evidence of the
WTO’s success in enabling countries to commit to liberalized trade due to the costs of retaliation.
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of corruption. The author finds a similar negative relationship using the Transparency
International index, but not when using the International Country Risk Guide measure.
Gatti (2004) also uses import share in GDP as a measure of trade volume and finds a
significant, negative association with corruption. However, the author notes this result to
be highly sensitive to the inclusion of Singapore in the sample. Singapore has an impressive
record on corruption and has a high measure of openness. Interestingly, Gatti (2004) also
finds the direct policy effect is of much greater magnitude than the foreign competition
effect. Finally, some researchers posit that the relationship between political corruption
and trade liberalization may be non-monotonic; increasing corruption at the initial stage
of liberalization, but eventually declining once liberalization reaches a critical threshold
level (e.g., Baksi et al. 2009).
An alternative claim can be made based on the analysis in Aghion et al.
(2005). The authors show theoretically and empirically that product market competition
encourages so-called ‘neck-and-neck’' firms to innovate, but discourages ‘laggard’' firms
from doing so. Ding et al. (2016) also find empirical support for this theory when the
competition explicitly arises from trade. An implication of this may be that laggard firms
resort to corruption to maintain viability in the face of increased foreign competition;
these firms treat innovation and corruption as substitutes. Related, Brou and Ruta (2011)
posit a theoretical model whereby economic integration, in the absence of political
integration, induce firms to substitute away from innovation toward rent-seeking
activities. Arguably, this pattern of greater economic integration without an equivalent
increase in political integration characterizes the WTO environment.

25

In sum, the evidence for foreign competition effect is not clear. The lack of
clarity becomes magnified when one accounts for the uncertainty regarding the impact of
the WTO on trade. Beginning with the seminal study of Rose (2004), concerns about the
effectiveness of the organization in spurring trade have surfaced. Subsequent studies have
attempted to ameliorate these concerns. For example, Subramanian and Wei (2007) argue
that the WTO has increased trade flows, but only among developed member countries.
Goldstein et al. (2007) argue that the WTO has increased trade once participating nonmember countries are considered as part of the treatment group. These countries are not
formal members by status, but hold the rights and obligations of a formal member. While
Roy (2011) finds some evidence of a positive effect of the GATT on trade when accounting
for participating non-members, he finds no impact of the WTO on trade once zero bilateral
trade flows are included and a theoretically consistent gravity model is estimated. Finally,
Allee and Scalera (2012) argue that there are heterogeneous effects of WTO membership
depending on the manner in which a country gained membership. Specifically, the authors
claim that member countries that went through a rigorous accession procedure benefit
the most from membership.
In the end, the effect of the WTO on trade volumes is ambiguous, as is the
evidence examining the impact of foreign competition on political corruption.

2.2

Policy Anchoring
A former EU Trade Commissioner stated publicly in 2007, in context of

Russia, that "WTO membership is also an anchor for domestic reforms." 20 Although
domestic reforms are the purview of a sovereign government, domestic policies and

20

See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/march/tradoc_133867.pdf
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institutions are strongly influenced by international organizations and other powerful
nations (Simmons et al. 2008). Keohane et al. (2009) argue that multilateral institutions
generally possess the ability to control the special interest groups in a country and protect
the rights of minorities. The quality of governance may, therefore, be improved. Along
these same lines, Sandholtz and Gray (2003, p. 761) argue that countries "that are open
to the rest of the world import not just goods and capital, but also ideas, information,
and norms." Establishment of policies and institutions in compliance with international
standards are essential for domestic firms to be able to compete with their foreign
counterparts. Thus, for a country acceding to an international organization, and
particularly to the WTO, improvements in governance and a reduction in political
corruption are assumed by many to be inevitable spillovers.
In a crude test of this hypothesis, Sandholtz and Gray (2003) investigate
the association between perception measures of corruption and an index measuring
memberships in various international organizations (e.g., GATT/WTO, IMF, United
Nations, etc.). The authors obtain a negative and statistically significant association.
Using composite indices for institutional quality based on a survey by the IMF (2000),
Drabek and Bacchetta (2004) show that WTO membership is associated with improved
governance in transition countries. Tang and Wei (2009) use the World Bank’s
Governance Matters indices to show that policy commitments enforced by an external
body like the WTO are associated with improvements in countries with poor governance
where reforms might otherwise be infeasible.
In contrast, Aaronson and Abouharb (2014, p. 549) point out that measures
of reforms and governance used in the prior literature are, perhaps, too "broad" to capture
27

how a policy anchoring effect might actually translate "norms into behavior." Bearing
this in mind, the authors recognize three specific WTO norms -- even-handedness, access
to information, and due process -- as relatively narrower metrics to assess the impact of
the WTO on governance. Even-handedness or non-discrimination of Article III refers to
treating everyone equally, both foreign and domestic market actors. Access to information
or transparency of Article X ensures certainty and clarity in trade practices and policies
such that they are conducted conspicuously and be an open information to all. Finally,
due process of Article X certifies all market actors to have freedom to influence trade
related regulations.
The authors use these metrics to explain when and how policy anchoring
takes place for a given country. For this, they divide their sample of countries into four
groups: (i) non-members who have never been a WTO member, (ii) completed negotiating
group who have finished all rounds of negotiation, (iii) new members who have been
approved to accede by the WTO but awaiting domestic approval, and (iv) long-standing
members who have been a GATT member since 1948. They hypothesize that if policy
anchoring takes place during the accession period, then there will be improvements in
these metrics while a country is negotiating membership in the WTO. Alternatively, if
countries anchor after membership, then the improvements will reflect gradually after the
accession process is complete. Regardless, the authors find mixed support for policy
anchoring. They do find some countries change their policies and laws both during and
after accession. However, the effect is uneven across the various governance metrics and
across countries.
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In sum, there is modest evidence of a positive association between WTO
membership and improved governance originating via policy anchoring. However,
inferring any sort of causal relationship from the existing evidence is precarious at best.
3

Empirics

3.1

Methodology
To provide the first credible evidence of the causal effect of WTO status on

corruption, we focus on the partial identification of the ATE, which represents the
expected impact of WTO status on the corruption practices of a randomly firm. The ATE
is a meaningful parameter to estimate given that, at present, all countries in our sample
are either a formal WTO member or possess observer status. 21 To proceed, we define the
conditional ATE of WTO status on firm-level corruption experiences as
𝛥(𝑋) = 𝑃[𝐻(𝑊𝑇𝑂∗ = 1) = 1|𝑋] − 𝑃[𝐻(𝑊𝑇𝑂∗ = 0) = 1|𝑋]

(1)

where 𝑃[⋅] denotes the probability that the argument is true, 𝐻 is a binary outcome with
value one if the firm is "honest" (an absence of corruption) and zero if not, 𝑊𝑇𝑂∗ is a
binary indicator of true WTO status, and 𝐻(1) ≡ 𝐻(𝑊𝑇𝑂∗ = 1) and 𝐻(0) ≡ 𝐻(𝑊𝑇𝑂∗ =
0) denote potential outcomes. Equation (1) represents the conditional ATE, conditional
on 𝑋, if 𝑋 is non-empty. In other words, if the probabilities are conditioned on observed
country- and/or firm-specific characteristics, then 𝛥(𝑋) represents the ATE for a
randomly selected country with characteristics given by 𝑋. If 𝑋 is empty, or one integrates
over the distribution of 𝑋, then (1) simplifies to the (overall) ATE, denoted simply by 𝛥.

21

The sample is discussed in detail in the next section.
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Point identification of 𝛥 and 𝛥(𝑋) is not straightforward for two reasons.
First, for any given firm, only one of two potential outcomes are observed; the other is
the missing counterfactual. With non-random selection into the treatment, identification
of the missing counterfactual is not possible in the absence of stringent, and likely
implausible, assumptions. Second, with misclassification, observed WTO status, WTO,
may differ from true status, 𝑊𝑇𝑂∗ . Given these challenges, our objective is to bound 𝛥
and 𝛥(𝑋).22 While still not straightforward, Kreider et al. (2012) and McCarthy et al.
(2015) document how to obtain sharp bounds under different assumptions concerning the
selection and misclassification processes. Imbens-Manski (2004) confidence intervals are
used to account for sampling uncertainty.
We explore the implications of the following assumptions on the bounds.
Note, we omit many of the details here in the interest of brevity, instead referring the
reader to these prior papers. Regarding selection into treatment, we consider the following
three assumptions:
(S1) Exogenous Selection (ES):
𝐻(0), 𝐻(1) ⊥ 𝑊𝑇𝑂∗ |𝑋 ∈ 𝛺
where 𝛺 denotes a particular set of values of 𝑋. However, as explained before, it is unlikely
that the decision to participate in the WTO is exogenous.
(S2) (Positive) Monotone Treatment Selection (MTS):
𝑃[𝐻(1) = 1|𝑊𝑇𝑂∗ = 1, 𝑋 ∈ 𝛺] ≥ 𝑃[𝐻(1) = 1|𝑊𝑇𝑂∗ = 0, 𝑋 ∈ 𝛺]

22

One might additionally consider measurement error in the outcome, H. While we do not explore this,
such errors would serve to further widen the bounds.
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𝑃[𝐻(0) = 1|𝑊𝑇𝑂∗ = 1, 𝑋 ∈ 𝛺] ≥ 𝑃[𝐻(0) = 1|𝑊𝑇𝑂∗ = 0, 𝑋 ∈ 𝛺]
Under this assumption, potential outcomes are at least as great in expectation in the
treatment group. In other words, firms in countries participating in the WTO are more
honest, on average, than firms in nonparticipating countries irrespective of its treatment
status. This assumption is plausible if one believes that WTO member countries, or
countries in the accession process, maintain a more honest and transparent standard of
doing business irrespective of actual membership. This is consistent with conjecture that
countries with better governance may join international organizations, such as the WTO,
to signal their quality (e.g., Drabek and Bacchetta 2004; Aaronson and Abouharb 2014).
(S3) Monotone Instrumental Variable (MIV):
𝑃[𝐻(1) = 1|𝜈 = 𝑢₁, 𝑋 ∈ 𝛺] ≤ 𝑃[𝐻(1) = 1|𝜈 = 𝑢, 𝑋 ∈ 𝛺] ≤ 𝑃[𝐻(1) = 1|𝜈 = 𝑢₂, 𝑋 ∈ 𝛺]
𝑃[𝐻(0) = 1|𝜈 = 𝑢₁, 𝑋 ∈ 𝛺] ≤ 𝑃[𝐻(0) = 1|𝜈 = 𝑢, 𝑋 ∈ 𝛺] ≤ 𝑃[𝐻(0) = 1|𝜈 = 𝑢₂, 𝑋 ∈ 𝛺],
where 𝜈 is the MIV and 𝑢₁ < 𝑢 < 𝑢₂. MIV assumes that potential outcomes are (weakly)
monotonically increasing in 𝑣.23 Here, we use Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita
as the MIV because of the widespread conclusion in the extant literature that richer
countries are generally less corrupt (e.g., Svensson 2005; Olken and Pande 2012). Thus,
under this assumption, firms in richer countries are likely to be more honest irrespective
of actual WTO status.
Regarding misclassification, we consider two assumptions:
(M1) Upper Bound Error Rate:

23

MIV needs to be combined with MTS to tighten the bounds (McCarthy et al. 2015).
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𝑃(𝑊𝑇𝑂 ≠ 𝑊𝑇𝑂∗ ) ≤ 𝑄
where Q is the maximum allowable misclassification rate of the WTO status. In the
analysis, we set 𝑄 = 0, 0.01, 0.03, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0.05.24
(M2) No False Positives (NFP):
𝑊𝑇𝑂 = 1 ⇒ 𝑊𝑇𝑂∗ = 1
which implies that nonparticipants in the WTO are never incorrectly classified as
members. As discussed in the next section, this assumption is fairly innocuous when we
define WTO as formal membership. However, it may be suspect when we define WTO as
countries in the accession process.25

3.2

Data
The data are from multiple sources. Sources and summary statistics are

provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. Corruption data come from the WBES, a survey
conducted by the World Bank in 1999-2000 across 80 countries.26 Managers of more than
9000 firms were interviewed about their direct experiences with bribe payments (in terms
of frequency) to public officials as they relate to their business. The outcome, H, equals
one if firm i in country j never pays a bribe to a public official while "getting their work

24

We utilize a few small values for Q to illustrate the effects of misclassification on the bounds. The width
of the bounds is non-decreasing in the maximum misclassification rate; thus, larger values of Q will only
serve to widen the bounds even further.
25

However, replacing the assumption of no false positives with an assumption of arbitrary errors has little
qualitative impact on the bounds. Results are available upon request.
26

Data are obtained from
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Pages/publishedpapers.html
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done." H equals zero if the manager reports having paid a bribe. The first treatment,
WTO, equals one if the firm is located in a country that is a formal member of the WTO
in 1999 and zero otherwise. The second treatment equals one if the firm is located in a
country that is not a formal member of the WTO in 1999 but becomes a formal member
in the future. The control group under the second treatment is comprised of firms located
in countries that are not formal WTO members in 1999 nor at present. The MIV is GDP
per capita in 1999.27
Countries in the sample, classified by formal WTO membership status, are
listed in Table A2 in the appendix. Recently, Tomz et al. (2007) brought to light the
differences between de jure and de facto membership in the WTO. The authors discuss
how WTO rules have long been applicable to both formal members as well as certain
nonmembers (e.g., some provisional members, certain colonies, and some newly
independent states). These countries are reported to be obligated by the rules and
regulations of the WTO despite not having a formal accession. Thus, we may observe a
country to be a nonmember officially, but in practice, it behaves as one. Moreover, as
shown in Table A2, all countries in our control group (i.e., not formal WTO members in
1999) have either observer or formal membership status in the WTO at present. Because
our first treatment defines WTO membership status using formal membership, there are
no instances of false positives (i.e., no countries are incorrectly classified as members).
However, assumptions (M1) and (M2) allow for various amounts of false negatives (i.e.,
countries incorrectly classified as nonmembers) in order to explore the sensitivity of the

27

GDP per capita is converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates.
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bounds to our membership definition.28 Our second treatment (control) group includes
those countries appearing in column 1 in Table A2 that eventually (never) gain formal
WTO membership.
To explore potential sources of heterogeneity, we condition the ATE on an
observed covariate, X. For this, we choose either a country- or a firm-specific attribute
and split the sample into sub-groups based on values of X. First, we condition on various
measures of market entry regulation. As a positive association between regulations in
general and corruption has been documented, one might conjecture that the impact of
WTO status may differ depending on other incentives for corruption (Djankov et al. 2002,
Svensson 2005). Moreover, as it is often postulated that "corruption is the much-needed
grease for the squeaking wheels of a rigid administration," any impact of WTO status on
the propensity of a firm to engage in bribery -- via the direct policy effect or foreign
competition effect -- may be exacerbated or attenuated when entrepreneurs face a higher
cost of market entry (Bardhan 1997, p. 1322). Three proxies for entry regulation are used:
(i) costs incurred, as a percent of per capita GDP, to start a business, (ii) the number of
procedures that a new firm must comply with to start operating as a legal entity, and (iii)
the number of days required to obtain legal status.29
Second, we condition on the level of FDI inflows and outflows. FDI flows
are generally associated with the quality of institutions and corruption (Wei 2000; Larrain

28

Note, while one could attempt to re-classify countries in the control group as members of the treatment
group, we do not pursue this strategy. To do so risks introducing misclassification in both directions. Using
formal WTO membership as the definition of our first treatment gives a clear interpretation to our findings
under the assumption of no misclassification and makes the assumption of no false positives innocuous.
29

The data are from Djankov et al. (2002). The measures are for 1999 except for missing observations which
are taken from 2004 World Bank’s Doing Business database.
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and Tavares 2004; Dang 2013). As a result, the effect of WTO status on corruption may
be exacerbated or attenuated depending on the level of FDI in which the country is
engaged. Two measures of FDI are used: (i) net inflows as a percent of GDP (i.e., net
inflow of new investment minus disinvestment in the reporting economy from foreign
investors) and (ii) net outflows as a percent of GDP (i.e., net outflow of new investment
minus disinvestment that the reporting country makes to the rest of the world).30
Third, we condition on whether the firm is government owned or not.31 On
the one hand, private firms are believed to be more vulnerable to demands from corrupt
officials because they have lower bargaining power and less recourse (Svensson 2003). On
the other hand, managers of public firms may face different performance incentives than
in private firms and therefore may be more likely to engage in bribery. Moreover, if public
firms are more likely to be ‘laggard’' firms, then they may be more likely to respond to
greater foreign competition by engaging in corruption. Again, the effect of WTO status
on corruption may be exacerbated or attenuated depending on the ownership status of
the firm. Finally, we condition on the export status of firms. Under the direct policy effect
hypothesis, WTO membership is expected to have a larger mitigating effect on bribery
by non-exporting firms. Hence, one might expect the behavior of exporting firms to be
less affected by WTO status.

30

The data are from the World Bank and are for 1999 unless missing in which data from the nearest
available year are used.
31

Data are from the WBES.
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4

4.1

Results

Baseline
We present the baseline results using the full sample in Table 1. Panel A

contains the results for the first treatment, defined as one if the firm is located in a country
that is a formal member of the WTO in 1999 and zero otherwise. Panel II contains the
results for the second treatment, defined as one if a firm is located in a country that
eventually becomes a formal WTO member and zero if it is located in a country that is
not a formal WTO member nor becomes one in the future. Each column represents a
specific combination of assumptions about the selection process. Each row specifies a
different maximum misclassification rate, 𝑄. Recall, the outcome indicator, 𝐻 = 1, means
that a firm is honest. Therefore, a negative ATE means that the treatment reduces the
probability of being honest; political corruption increases with the treatment.
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Table 1. Sharp Bounds on the ATE of WTO Status on Corruption
Assumptions Regarding Selection
Q

Exogenous Selection

Worst-Case

MTS

MTS & MIV

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

I. Treatment = Formal WTO Membership in 1999
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

[ -0.006, -0.006] p.e.

[ -0.593, 0.407] p.e.

[ -0.593, -0.006] p.e.

[ -0.586, -0.066] p.e.

[ -0.024, 0.022] CI

[ -0.603, 0.419] CI

[ -0.603, 0.022] CI

[ -0.600, -0.035] CI

[ -0.021, 0.031] p.e.

[ -0.603, 0.417] p.e.

[ -0.603, 0.031] p.e.

[ -0.596, -0.021] p.e.

[ -0.040, 0.059] CI

[ -0.613, 0.429] CI

[ -0.613, 0.059] CI

[ -0.611, -0.001] CI

[ -0.057, 0.109] p.e.

[ -0.623, 0.437] p.e.

[ -0.623, 0.109] p.e.

[ -0.618, 0.046] p.e.

[ -0.076, 0.139] CI

[ -0.633, 0.449] CI

[ -0.633, 0.139] CI

[ -0.631, 0.068] CI

[ -0.097, 0.199] p.e.

[ -0.643, 0.457] p.e.

[ -0.643, 0.199] p.e.

[ -0.636, 0.119] p.e.

[ -0.117, 0.230] CI

[ -0.653, 0.469] CI

[ -0.653, 0.230] CI

[ -0.650, 0.129] CI

II. Treatment = Formal WTO Membership After 1999
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

[ -0.016, -0.016] p.e.

[ -0.611, 0.389] p.e.

[ -0.611, -0.016] p.e.

[ -0.552, -0.081] p.e.

[ -0.055, 0.027] CI

[ -0.629, 0.406] CI

[ -0.629, 0.027] CI

[ -0.574, -0.039] CI

[ -0.034, 0.024] p.e.

[ -0.621, 0.399] p.e.

[ -0.621, 0.024] p.e.

[ -0.561, -0.049] p.e.

[ -0.074, 0.069] CI

[ -0.639, 0.416] CI

[ -0.639, 0.069] CI

[ -0.583, -0.002] CI

[ -0.077, 0.115] p.e.

[ -0.641, 0.419] p.e.

[ -0.641, 0.115] p.e.

[ -0.579, 0.034] p.e.

[ -0.118, 0.163] CI

[ -0.659, 0.436] CI

[ -0.659, 0.163] CI

[ -0.601, 0.086] CI

[ -0.128, 0.221] p.e.

[ -0.661, 0.439] p.e.

[ -0.661, 0.221] p.e.

[ -0.597, 0.080] p.e.

[ -0.170, 0.279] CI

[ -0.659, 0.436] CI

[ -0.679, 0.279] CI

[ -0.618, 0.153] CI

Notes: p.e. = point estimates; CI = confidence interval. Imbens-Manski (2004) 95% CIs obtained using 100
bootstrap repetitions. Q = maximum rate of misclassification of treatment assignment. Assumptions of no
false positives and positive selection are imposed. Outcome equals one if a firm reports never paying a bribe,
zero otherwise. MIV is GDP per capita. Treatment assignment in Panel I equals one if a country is a formal
WTO member in 1999, zero otherwise. Treatment assignment in Panel II equals one if a country is not a
formal WTO member in 1999 but becomes a formal member by 2016, zero if a country is not a formal member
in 1999 or by 2016. Number of observations = 8952 (Panel I), 2374 (Panel II). See text for further details.

In terms of Panel I (formal WTO membership), we start by assuming there
is no measurement error (𝑄 = 0). As a result, the ATE should be interpreted as the
expected impact of formal WTO membership relative to not being a formal member.
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Under the assumption of exogenous selection, the point estimate indicates that
membership increases corruption by 0.6 percentage points on average. In addition to being
very close to zero, the estimate is not statistically different from zero at the 95%
confidence level. Imposing no assumptions on the selection process (i.e., the worst-case
bounds), the estimated bounds are [−0.593, 0.407]. The bounds necessarily have a width
of one and include zero. Nonetheless, without imposing any assumptions, the bounds rule
out a reduction in political corruption upon attaining formal WTO membership of more
than 41 percentage points.
Imposing the assumption of (positive) MTS, however, drastically reduces
the upper bound. The estimated bounds, [−0.593, −0.006] now exclude zero, although the
95% confidence interval still includes zero. Thus, the assumption of greater honesty (in
expectation) among firms in the treatment group relative to firms in the control group,
holding WTO membership fixed, has significant identifying power. This assumption, while
not testable, is plausible given the fact that the treatment group entails countries that
are generally more developed and existing empirical evidence shows that corruption
declines with development (e.g., Svensson 2005; Olken and Pande 2012).
Imposing the joint assumptions of (positive) MTS and MIV, the bounds are
further tightened.32 The estimated bounds, [−0.586, −0.066] are strictly negative; the 95%
confidence interval excludes zero as well.33 The bounds indicate a large adverse expected

32

See also Figure A1 in the appendix.
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For the MIV bounds, the samples are divided into five GDP per capita cells. The MIV estimator is biased
in finite samples, but consistent (Manski and Pepper 2000). We use Kreider and Pepper's (2007)
nonparametric finite sample bias-corrected MIV estimator (McCarthy et al. 2015).
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impact on corruption due to formal membership. Specifically, under what might consider
to be fairly innocuous assumptions, WTO membership increases the probability of a firm
engaging in bribery by at least 7 and as much as 59 percentage points.
Given our earlier discussion of the existing rhetoric and research, our result
is very surprising. Three possible explanations exist. First, the most commonly posited
foreign competition effect discussed above is incorrect. Instead of an increase in foreign
competition reducing available rents, and hence bribery, ‘laggard’' firms respond by
increasing bribery in an effort to remain competitive. As noted in Aghion et al. (2005),
greater product market competition is expected to widen the technological gap between
advanced and laggard firms. Our finding is consistent with growth in the technological
gap resulting in greater political corruption. Second, if the policy anchoring effect exists,
it may be that the largest beneficial effect of the WTO on corruption occurs during the
accession process. Since countries in the midst of the accession process belong to the
control group, our results in Panel I may reflect a large decline in corruption during the
accession phase followed by a reversion to pre-existing levels of corruption following formal
membership. Finally, WTO membership may alter the composition of entrepreneurs who
decide to enter the market. With greater foreign competition and overseas business
opportunities under WTO membership, perhaps only more politically savvy entrepreneurs
find it profitable to enter the market. As a result, the increase in corruption may reflect
a shift in the types of firm owners and managers in a country.
To assess the second possibility, we begin by continuing to define the
treatment as formal WTO membership, but we now allow for misclassification of
membership status. This accounts for the possibility that some non-formal member
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countries may be more similar to the treatment group due to being engaged in the
accession process or having de facto membership in the WTO. The impact of allowing for
possible misclassification - even as little as 𝑄 = 0.01 - is a widening of the bounds under
any given set of assumptions concerning the selection process. As a result of this widening,
the point estimates for the bounds now include zero in nearly every case. The only
exception is when we impose the joint assumptions of (positive) MTS and MIV along with
𝑄 = 0.01; the 95% confidence interval also excludes zero in this case. Moreover, with 𝑄 =
0.05, we cannot rule out WTO membership reducing political corruption by around 10
percentage points. Thus, even with stricter assumptions about the selection process, we
can now no longer rule out the WTO having beneficial effects on political corruption
under even small amounts of misclassification.
We also assess the second possibility by turning to Panel II, where the
treatment is defined as one if a firm is located in a country that eventually becomes a
formal WTO member and zero if it is located in a country that is not a formal WTO
member nor becomes one in the future. Surprisingly, we obtain stronger results than in
Panel I. To start, assume there is no measurement error (𝑄 = 0). As a result, the ATE
should be interpreted as the expected impact of not being a formal WTO member in 1999
but becoming a formal WTO member in the future relative to never becoming a formal

member. We can loosely think of the treatment as countries in the accession process in
1999. However, this may entail some misclassification since some countries may have yet
to begun the accession process despite becoming a formal member in the future and others
may have started the accession process in 1999 but have yet to obtain formal membership.
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Under the assumption of exogenous selection, the point estimate indicates
that membership increases corruption by 1.6 percentage points on average. In addition to
being very close to zero, the estimate is not statistically different from zero at the 95%
confidence level. Imposing no assumptions on the selection process (i.e., the worst-case
bounds), the estimated bounds are [−0.611, 0.389]. Imposing the assumption of (positive)
MTS drastically reduces the upper bound. The estimated bounds, [−0.611, −0.016] now
exclude zero, although the 95% confidence interval still includes zero. Imposing the joint
assumptions of (positive) MTS and MIV, the bounds are further tightened.34 The
estimated bounds, [−0.552, −0.081] are strictly negative; the 95% confidence interval
excludes zero as well. Thus, the bounds indicate a large adverse expected impact on
corruption due to accession as well. Specifically, under what might consider to be fairly
innocuous assumptions, the accession process to the WTO increases the probability of a
firm engaging in bribery by at least eight and as much as 55 percentage points. Allowing
for possible misclassification widens the bounds. However, the joint assumptions of
(positive) MTS and MIV along with 𝑄 = 0.01 still yield bounds that exclude zero; the
95% confidence interval excludes zero as well. Allowing for greater misclassification rates
produces bounds that include zero.
To assess the third possibility that formal WTO membership alters the
selection of entrepreneurs who enter the market, we revert back to our first treatment
(formal WTO membership) but alter the composition of the treatment group. In Panel I
in Table 2, the treatment group is now restricted to firms established in years prior to the
attainment of formal WTO membership. The control group is unaltered from Panel I in

34

See also Figure A1 in the appendix.

41

Table 1. Since all firms in the control group are necessarily established prior to formal
WTO membership, the ATE is interpreted as the expected effect of formal WTO
membership on firms established prior to formal WTO membership. In Panel II in Table
2, the treatment group includes only firms established in the year of attainment of formal
WTO membership or thereafter. Again, the control group is unaltered.

Table 2. Sharp Bounds on the ATE of WTO Membership on Corruption: Firm Age
Assumptions Regarding Selection
Q

Exogenous Selection

Worst-Case

MTS

MTS & MIV

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

I. Firms Established Prior to Formal Membership
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

[ 0.049, 0.049] p.e.

[ -0.524, 0.476] p.e.

[ -0.524, 0.049] p.e.

[ -0.519, -0.042] p.e.

[ 0.025, 0.070] CI

[ -0.533, 0.487] CI

[ -0.533, 0.070] CI

[ -0.530, -0.018] CI

[ 0.035, 0.079] p.e.

[ -0.534, 0.486] p.e.

[ -0.534, 0.079] p.e.

[ -0.527, -0.013] p.e.

[ 0.011, 0.100] CI

[ -0.543, 0.497] CI

[ -0.543, 0.100] CI

[ -0.538, 0.013] CI

[ 0.004, 0.141] p.e.

[ -0.554, 0.506] p.e.

[ -0.554, 0.141] p.e.

[ -0.543, 0.033] p.e.

[ -0.021, 0.163] CI

[ -0.563, 0.517] CI

[ -0.563, 0.163] CI

[ -0.555, 0.066] CI

[ -0.028, 0.208] p.e.

[ -0.574, 0.526] p.e.

[ -0.574, 0.208] p.e.

[ -0.559, 0.081] p.e.

[ -0.054, 0.229] CI

[ -0.583, 0.537] CI

[ -0.583, 0.229] CI

[ -0.571, 0.118] CI

II. Firms Established Post Formal Membership
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

[ -0.033, -0.033] p.e.

[ -0.399, 0.601] p.e.

[ -0.399, -0.033] p.e.

[ -0.354, -0.219] p.e.

[ -0.065, 0.012] CI

[ -0.413, 0.619] CI

[ -0.413, 0.012] CI

[ -0.408, -0.141] CI

[ -0.048, 0.008] p.e.

[ -0.409, 0.611] p.e.

[ -0.409, 0.008] p.e.

[ -0.364, -0.127] p.e.

[ -0.079, 0.052] CI

[ -0.423, 0.629] CI

[ -0.423, 0.052] CI

[ -0.418, -0.083] CI

[ -0.079, 0.083] p.e.

[ -0.429, 0.631] p.e.

[ -0.429, 0.083] p.e.

[ -0.384, -0.033] p.e.

[ -0.108, 0.121] CI

[ -0.443, 0.649] CI

[ -0.443, 0.121] CI

[ -0.438, 0.020] CI

[ -0.106, 0.150] p.e.

[ -0.449, 0.651] p.e.

[ -0.449, 0.150] p.e.

[ -0.404, 0.039] p.e.

[ -0.134, 0.186] CI

[ -0.463, 0.669] CI

[ -0.463, 0.186] CI

[ -0.458, 0.106] CI

Notes: p.e. = point estimates; CI = confidence interval. Imbens-Manski (2004) 95% CIs obtained using 100
bootstrap repetitions. Q = maximum rate of misclassification of WTO status. Assumptions of no false
positives and positive selection are imposed. Outcome equals one if a firm reports never paying a bribe, zero
otherwise. MIV is GDP per capita. Number of observations = 6709 (Panel I), 3027 (Panel II). See text for
further details.
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If formal WTO membership shifts the composition of entrepreneurs towards
those with a greater propensity to engage in corrupt behavior, we expect stronger evidence
of an increase in corruption in Panel II. However, this is not a perfect test. First, formal
WTO membership may affect firms established prior to formal WTO membership through
the replacement of managers with new employees more prone to engage in corruption if
the entrepreneur selection hypothesis is true. In other words, any compositional effect
may operate through the selection of employees by firms rather than the selection of firms
into the market. Second, the interpretation of the ATE is not as clean in Panel II as it
reflects the expected effect of formal WTO membership in the population of firms for
which the sample represents (which is a mix of firms established after formal WTO
membership in countries that were formal members in 1999 and all firms in countries that
were not formal members in 1999). Nonetheless, the results should indicate a greater
increase in corruption in Panel II if the entrepreneur selection hypothesis has credence.
Assessing the results, this is indeed what we find. First, under the
assumptions of no measurement error (𝑄 = 0) and exogenous selection, the point
estimates indicate that membership decreases corruption by 4.9 percentage points in Panel
I and increases corruption by 3.3 percentage points in Panel II; only the former is
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Second, the estimated bounds under
MTS-MIV (point estimates and 95% confidence intervals) exclude zero in both panels.35
However, whereas the bounds are wide in Panel I (point estimates = [−0.519, −0.042]),
they are considerably tighter in Panel II (point estimates = [−0.354, −0.219]). Thus, the
evidence is stronger in Panel II as the 95% confidence interval indicates at least a 14

35

See also Figure A2 in the appendix.
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percentage point increase in corruption when the treatment group is restricted to firms
established after formal WTO membership. Finally, when we allow for modest
misclassification (𝑄 > 0), we continue to find stronger evidence in Panel II. Specifically,
the point estimates of the bounds exclude zero even when 𝑄 = 0.03 and the 95%
confidence intervals exclude zero even when 𝑄 = 0.01. The 95% confidence intervals never
exclude zero with 𝑄 > 0 in Panel I.
In sum, our baseline analysis reveals three important findings. First, there
is convincing evidence that formal WTO membership increases political corruption (in a
causal sense), contrary to prior beliefs. Second, the magnitude of the effect of formal
membership depends crucially on assumptions concerning selection into the WTO.
However, under plausible assumptions (in our view), formal WTO membership increases
the probability of a firm paying a bribe by at least three percentage points (and at most
60 percentage points). Finally, this effect is not driven by policy anchoring during the
accession phase, leading to drastic reductions in political corruption among the control
group. When assessing the impact of future formal WTO membership on political
corruption, the data point to a similar increase in political corruption. However, it may
be due, at least in part, to a compositional change in the types of entrepreneurs that
choose to enter the market after the attainment of formal WTO membership.

4.2
4.2.1

Heterogeneity
Formal WTO Membership
To better understand under what conditions the WTO may be more likely

to influence political corruption, we bound the ATE conditional on various country- and
firm-specific features. Results utilizing our first treatment (formal WTO membership)
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are presented in Tables 3-9. Figures A3-A9 in the appendix plot the corresponding
bounds under the joint MTS-MIV assumptions for each sub-sample.

4.2.1.1 Entry Regulation
In Tables 3-5 we split the sample into firms in countries with high and low
levels of regulation governing market entry by firms. In each table, Panel I (Panel II)
displays the results for the sub-sample of firms facing high (low) entry regulation. In Table
3 the measure of entry regulation is based on the cost of starting a new business. In Table
4 the number of procedures required to start a new business is used. In Table 5 the
measure of entry regulation is based on the number of days it takes to start a new business.
In all three tables, we find evidence suggesting a more adverse effect of the WTO on
political corruption in countries with high regulation.
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Table 3. Sharp Bounds on the ATE of WTO Membership on Corruption: Entry Regulation (Cost of
Starting a Business)
Assumptions Regarding Selection
Q

Exogenous Selection

Worst-Case

MTS

MTS & MIV

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

I. High Regulation (above the median)
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

[ -0.073, -0.073] p.e.

[ -0.634, 0.366] p.e.

[ -0.634, -0.073] p.e.

[ -0.595, -0.130] p.e.

[ -0.100, -0.043] CI

[ -0.647, 0.383] CI

[ -0.647, -0.043] CI

[ -0.616, -0.085] CI

[ -0.086, -0.037] p.e.

[ -0.644, 0.376] p.e.

[ -0.644, -0.037] p.e.

[ -0.605, -0.090] p.e.

[ -0.114, -0.008] CI

[ -0.657, 0.393] CI

[ -0.657, -0.008] CI

[ -0.626, -0.040] CI

[ -0.115, 0.038] p.e.

[ -0.664, 0.396] p.e.

[ -0.664, 0.038] p.e.

[ -0.625, -0.009] p.e.

[ -0.144, 0.068] CI

[ -0.677, 0.413] CI

[ -0.677, 0.068] CI

[ -0.646, 0.030] CI

[ -0.148, 0.122] p.e.

[ -0.684, 0.416] p.e.

[ -0.684, 0.122] p.e.

[ -0.645, 0.039] p.e.

[ -0.179, 0.153] CI

[ -0.697, 0.433] CI

[ -0.697, 0.153] CI

[ -0.666, 0.115] CI

II. Low Regulation (below the median)
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

[ 0.040, 0.040] p.e.

[ -0.559, 0.441] p.e.

[ -0.559, 0.040] p.e.

[ -0.559, -0.001] p.e.

[ 0.004, 0.079] CI

[ -0.572, 0.460] CI

[ -0.572, 0.079] CI

[ -0.572, 0.020] CI

[ 0.022, 0.078] p.e.

[ -0.569, 0.451] p.e.

[ -0.569, 0.078] p.e.

[ -0.566, 0.024] p.e.

[ -0.016, 0.116] CI

[ -0.582, 0.470] CI

[ -0.582, 0.116] CI

[ -0.582, 0.044] CI

[ -0.019, 0.160] p.e.

[ -0.589, 0.471] p.e.

[ -0.589, 0.160] p.e.

[ -0.578, 0.079] p.e.

[ -0.060, 0.199] CI

[ -0.602, 0.490] CI

[ -0.602, 0.199] CI

[ -0.596, 0.096] CI

[ -0.067, 0.255] p.e.

[ -0.609, 0.491] p.e.

[ -0.609, 0.255] p.e.

[ -0.591, 0.131] p.e.

[ -0.111, 0.295] CI

[ -0.622, 0.510] CI

[ -0.622, 0.295] CI

[ -0.609, 0.152] CI

Notes: p.e. = point estimates; CI = confidence interval. Imbens-Manski (2004) 95% CIs obtained using 100
bootstrap repetitions. Q = maximum rate of misclassification of WTO status. Assumptions of no false
positives and positive selection are imposed. Outcome equals one if a firm reports never paying a bribe, zero
otherwise. MIV is GDP per capita. Number of observations = 4521 (Panel I), 4291 (Panel II). See text for
further details.
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Table 4. Sharp Bounds on the ATE of WTO Membership on Corruption: Entry Regulation (Number of
Procedures to Start a Business)
Assumptions Regarding Selection
Q

Exogenous Selection

Worst-Case

MTS

MTS & MIV

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

I. High Regulation (above the median)
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

[ -0.019, -0.019] p.e.

[ -0.528, 0.472] p.e.

[ -0.528, -0.019] p.e.

[ -0.509, -0.053] p.e.

[ -0.044, 0.005] CI

[ -0.543, 0.485] CI

[ -0.543, 0.005] CI

[ -0.539, -0.022] CI

[ -0.031, 0.009] p.e.

[ -0.538, 0.482] p.e.

[ -0.538, 0.009] p.e.

[ -0.519, -0.019] p.e.

[ -0.056, 0.033] CI

[ -0.553, 0.495] CI

[ -0.553, 0.033] CI

[ -0.549, 0.005] CI

[ -0.056, 0.066] p.e.

[ -0.558, 0.502] p.e.

[ -0.558, 0.066] p.e.

[ -0.539, 0.038] p.e.

[ -0.082, 0.091] CI

[ -0.573, 0.515] CI

[ -0.573, 0.091] CI

[ -0.569, 0.057] CI

[ -0.083, 0.125] p.e.

[ -0.578, 0.522] p.e.

[ -0.578, 0.125] p.e.

[ -0.559, 0.087] p.e.

[ -0.109, 0.150] CI

[ -0.593, 0.535] CI

[ -0.593, 0.150] CI

[ -0.589, 0.106] CI

II. Low Regulation (below the median)
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

[ 0.018, 0.018] p.e.

[ -0.673, 0.327] p.e.

[ -0.673, 0.018] p.e.

[ -0.670, -0.026] p.e.

[ -0.027, 0.065] CI

[ -0.686, 0.343] CI

[ -0.686, 0.065] CI

[ -0.686, 0.038] CI

[ -0.029, 0.144] p.e.

[ -0.683, 0.337] p.e.

[ -0.683, 0.144] p.e.

[ -0.675, 0.042] p.e.

[ -0.080, 0.202] CI

[ -0.696, 0.353] CI

[ -0.696, 0.202] CI

[ -0.692, 0.106] CI

[ -0.193, 0.312] p.e.

[ -0.703, 0.347] p.e.

[ -0.703, 0.312] p.e.

[ -0.686, 0.151] p.e.

[ -0.295, 0.328] CI

[ -0.716, 0.363] CI

[ -0.716, 0.328] CI

[ -0.704, 0.243] CI

[ -0.661, 0.312] p.e.

[ -0.723, 0.347] p.e.

[ -0.723, 0.312] p.e.

[ -0.696, 0.312] p.e.

[ -0.720, 0.328] CI

[ -0.736, 0.363] CI

[ -0.736, 0.328] CI

[ -0.716, 0.328] CI

Notes: p.e. = point estimates; CI = confidence interval. Imbens-Manski (2004) 95% CIs obtained using 100
bootstrap repetitions. Q = maximum rate of misclassification of WTO status. Assumptions of no false
positives and positive selection are imposed. Outcome equals one if a firm reports never paying a bribe, zero
otherwise. MIV is GDP per capita. Number of observations = 4574 (Panel I), 4238 (Panel II). See text for
further details.
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Table 5. Sharp Bounds on the ATE of WTO Membership on Corruption: Entry Regulation (Days Required
to Start a Business)
Assumptions Regarding Selection
Q

Exogenous Selection

Worst-Case

MTS

MTS & MIV

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

I. High Regulation (above the median)
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

[ -0.022, -0.022] p.e.

[ -0.587, 0.413] p.e.

[ -0.587, -0.022] p.e.

[ -0.562, -0.047] p.e.

[ -0.057, 0.005] CI

[ -0.603, 0.428] CI

[ -0.603, 0.005] CI

[ -0.589, -0.021] CI

[ -0.037, 0.011] p.e.

[ -0.597, 0.423] p.e.

[ -0.597, 0.011] p.e.

[ -0.569, -0.022] p.e.

[ -0.072, 0.039] CI

[ -0.613, 0.438] CI

[ -0.613, 0.039] CI

[ -0.596, 0.001] CI

[ -0.069, 0.081] p.e.

[ -0.617, 0.443] p.e.

[ -0.617, 0.081] p.e.

[ -0.581, 0.030] p.e.

[ -0.106, 0.111] CI

[ -0.633, 0.458] CI

[ -0.633, 0.111] CI

[ -0.609, 0.048] CI

[ -0.105, 0.159] p.e.

[ -0.637, 0.463] p.e.

[ -0.637, 0.159] p.e.

[ -0.594, 0.075] p.e.

[ -0.144, 0.192] CI

[ -0.653, 0.478] CI

[ -0.653, 0.192] CI

[ -0.622, 0.099] CI

II. Low Regulation (below the median)
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

[ -0.002, -0.002] p.e.

[ -0.608, 0.392] p.e.

[ -0.608, -0.002] p.e.

[ -0.549, -0.025] p.e.

[ -0.026, 0.032] CI

[ -0.623, 0.405] CI

[ -0.623, 0.032] CI

[ -0.612, 0.014] CI

[ -0.019, 0.038] p.e.

[ -0.618, 0.402] p.e.

[ -0.618, 0.038] p.e.

[ -0.557, 0.001] p.e.

[ -0.044, 0.074] CI

[ -0.633, 0.415] CI

[ -0.633, 0.074] CI

[ -0.620, 0.037] CI

[ -0.057, 0.128] p.e.

[ -0.638, 0.422] p.e.

[ -0.638, 0.128] p.e.

[ -0.574, 0.057] p.e.

[ -0.086, 0.166] CI

[ -0.653, 0.435] CI

[ -0.653, 0.166] CI

[ -0.636, 0.082] CI

[ -0.102, 0.232] p.e.

[ -0.658, 0.442] p.e.

[ -0.658, 0.232] p.e.

[ -0.590, 0.115] p.e.

[ -0.135, 0.274] CI

[ -0.673, 0.455] CI

[ -0.673, 0.274] CI

[ -0.652, 0.141] CI

Notes: p.e. = point estimates; CI = confidence interval. Imbens-Manski (2004) 95% CIs obtained using 100
bootstrap repetitions. Q = maximum rate of misclassification of WTO status. Assumptions of no false
positives and positive selection are imposed. Outcome equals one if a firm reports never paying a bribe, zero
otherwise. MIV is GDP per capita. Number of observations = 4441 (Panel I), 4371 (Panel II). See text for
further details.

Focusing on the joint MTS-MIV bounds, the estimated bounds (point
estimates and 95% confidence intervals) exclude zero using all three measures when the
sample is restricted to countries with high entry regulation and misclassification is not
allowed (𝑄 = 0). Formal WTO membership is found to increase political corruption in
high regulation countries by at least nine, two, and two percentage points in Tables 3-5,
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respectively. The 95% confidence intervals for the corresponding bounds in low regulation
countries never exclude zero. The stronger evidence of an increase in corruption due to
formal WTO membership in high regulation countries is consistent, first and foremost,
with important interactions between formal WTO membership and the domestic business
environment. Second, it is consistent with high entry regulation protecting ‘laggard’' firms
in the sense of Aghion et al. (2005) and these firms resorting to an increase in bribery in
response greater foreign competition under the WTO. Finally, the result may be explained
by high entry regulation, in combination with greater foreign competition, altering the
selection of entrepreneurs into the market; namely, moving from more honest types to
those more likely to engage in deceptive practices.
When we allow for modest misclassification (𝑄 > 0), we continue to find
some statistically significant evidence of an adverse impact of the WTO on political
corruption in high regulation countries. Using costs to measure entry regulation (Table
3), the estimated bounds exclude zero even when 𝑄 = 0.03 and the 95% confidence
intervals exclude zero even when 𝑄 = 0.01. Using the number of procedures or days to
start a new business (Tables 4 and 5, respectively), the estimated bounds exclude zero
when 𝑄 = 0.01, but the 95% confidence intervals do not. Allowing for misclassification,
we also find that the maximum possible beneficial effect of the WTO on political
corruption is higher in low regulation countries. For example, when using the number of
procedures required to start a new business (Table 4), we find that the WTO causes at
best an 11 (33) percentage point reduction in bribery in high (low) regulation countries.
In sum, we find evidence consistent with important interactions between
WTO membership and the domestic regulatory environment as it relates to firm entry.
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The adverse impact of formal WTO membership found in the full sample is driven by
countries with high market entry regulation. This is consistent with the positive
association between entry regulation and corruption shown in Djankov et al. (2002).
However, it goes a step further by showing that WTO membership is likely to exacerbate
this association.

4.2.1.2 Foreign Direct Investment
In Tables 6-7 we split the sample into firms in countries with high and low
FDI flows. In each table, Panel I (Panel II) displays the results for the sub-sample of firms
in countries with high (low) FDI flows. In Table 6 the measure of FDI is based on inflows;
Table 7 is based on outflows.
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Table 6. Sharp Bounds on the ATE of WTO Membership on Corruption: FDI Net Inflows (as % of GDP)
Assumptions Regarding Selection
Q

Exogenous Selection

Worst-Case

MTS

MTS & MIV

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

I. High Inflows (above the median)
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

[ 0.039, 0.039] p.e.

[ -0.560, 0.440] p.e.

[ -0.560, 0.039] p.e.

[ -0.535, -0.073] p.e.

[ 0.008, 0.066] CI

[ -0.573, 0.453] CI

[ -0.573, 0.066] CI

[ -0.559, -0.033] CI

[ 0.023, 0.074] p.e.

[ -0.570, 0.450] p.e.

[ -0.570, 0.074] p.e.

[ -0.543, -0.049] p.e.

[ -0.007, 0.102] CI

[ -0.583, 0.463] CI

[ -0.583, 0.102] CI

[ -0.567, -0.007] CI

[ -0.013, 0.151] p.e.

[ -0.590, 0.470] p.e.

[ -0.590, 0.151] p.e.

[ -0.559, -0.001] p.e.

[ -0.044, 0.179] CI

[ -0.603, 0.483] CI

[ -0.603, 0.179] CI

[ -0.584, 0.052] CI

[ -0.053, 0.237] p.e.

[ -0.610, 0.490] p.e.

[ -0.610, 0.237] p.e.

[ -0.575, 0.044] p.e.

[ -0.086, 0.269] CI

[ -0.623, 0.503] CI

[ -0.623, 0.269] CI

[ -0.600, 0.118] CI

[ -0.050, -0.050] p.e.

[ -0.627, 0.373] p.e.

[ -0.627, -0.050] p.e.

[ -0.568, -0.095] p.e.

[ -0.077, -0.018] CI

[ -0.639, 0.388] CI

[ -0.639, -0.018] CI

[ -0.598, -0.049] CI

[ -0.065, -0.012] p.e.

[ -0.637, 0.383] p.e.

[ -0.637, -0.012] p.e.

[ -0.574, -0.062] p.e.

[ -0.093, 0.020] CI

[ -0.649, 0.398] CI

[ -0.649, 0.020] CI

[ -0.605, -0.018] CI

[ -0.101, 0.069] p.e.

[ -0.657, 0.403] p.e.

[ -0.657, 0.069] p.e.

[ -0.588, 0.008] p.e.

[ -0.130, 0.101] CI

[ -0.669, 0.418] CI

[ -0.669, 0.101] CI

[ -0.619, 0.057] CI

[ -0.141, 0.162] p.e.

[ -0.677, 0.423] p.e.

[ -0.677, 0.162] p.e.

[ -0.602, 0.060] p.e.

[ -0.172, 0.194] CI

[ -0.689, 0.438] CI

[ -0.689, 0.194] CI

[ -0.632, 0.110] CI

II. Low Inflows (below the median)
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

Notes: p.e. = point estimates; CI = confidence interval. Imbens-Manski (2004) 95% CIs obtained using 100
bootstrap repetitions. Q = maximum rate of misclassification of WTO status. Assumptions of no false
positives and positive selection are imposed. Outcome equals one if a firm reports never paying a bribe, zero
otherwise. MIV is GDP per capita. Number of observations = 4477 (Panel I), 4475 (Panel II). See text for
further details.
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Table 7. Sharp Bounds on the ATE of WTO Membership on Corruption: FDI Net Outflows (as % of GDP)
Assumptions Regarding Selection
Q

Exogenous Selection

Worst-Case

MTS

MTS & MIV

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

I. High Outflows (above the median)
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

[ 0.116, 0.116] p.e.

[ -0.513, 0.487] p.e.

[ -0.513, 0.116] p.e.

[ -0.510, 0.075] p.e.

[ 0.075, 0.146] CI

[ -0.530, 0.504] CI

[ -0.530, 0.146] CI

[ -0.527, 0.104] CI

[ 0.097, 0.156] p.e.

[ -0.523, 0.497] p.e.

[ -0.523, 0.156] p.e.

[ -0.516, 0.099] p.e.

[ 0.054, 0.186] CI

[ -0.540, 0.514] CI

[ -0.540, 0.186] CI

[ -0.535, 0.127] CI

[ 0.051, 0.244] p.e.

[ -0.543, 0.517] p.e.

[ -0.543, 0.244] p.e.

[ -0.527, 0.157] p.e.

[ 0.004, 0.276] CI

[ -0.560, 0.534] CI

[ -0.560, 0.276] CI

[ -0.553, 0.195] CI

[ -0.001, 0.349] p.e.

[ -0.563, 0.537] p.e.

[ -0.563, 0.349] p.e.

[ -0.537, 0.201] p.e.

[ -0.053, 0.384] CI

[ -0.580, 0.554] CI

[ -0.580, 0.384] CI

[ -0.570, 0.254] CI

[ -0.137, -0.137] p.e.

[ -0.662, 0.338] p.e.

[ -0.662, -0.137] p.e.

[ -0.629, -0.245] p.e.

[ -0.173, -0.107] CI

[ -0.680, 0.351] CI

[ -0.680, -0.107] CI

[ -0.680, -0.179] CI

[ -0.150, -0.102] p.e.

[ -0.672, 0.348] p.e.

[ -0.672, -0.102] p.e.

[ -0.638, -0.205] p.e.

[ -0.187, -0.073] CI

[ -0.690, 0.361] CI

[ -0.690, -0.073] CI

[ -0.689, -0.130] CI

[ -0.179, -0.030] p.e.

[ -0.692, 0.368] p.e.

[ -0.692, -0.030] p.e.

[ -0.656, -0.108] p.e.

[ -0.218, 0.000] CI

[ -0.710, 0.381] CI

[ -0.710, 0.000] CI

[ -0.707, -0.042] CI

[ -0.213, 0.050] p.e.

[ -0.712, 0.388] p.e.

[ -0.712, 0.050] p.e.

[ -0.674, -0.017] p.e.

[ -0.254, 0.081] CI

[ -0.730, 0.401] CI

[ -0.730, 0.081] CI

[ -0.722, 0.030] CI

II. Low Outflows (below the median)
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

Notes: p.e. = point estimates; CI = confidence interval. Imbens-Manski (2004) 95% CIs obtained using 100
bootstrap repetitions. Q = maximum rate of misclassification of WTO status. Assumptions of no false
positives and positive selection are imposed. Outcome equals one if a firm reports never paying a bribe, zero
otherwise. MIV is GDP per capita. Number of observations = 4142 (Panel I), 4077 (Panel II). See text for
further details.

Splitting the sample by FDI net inflows as a percent of GDP (Table 6), we
find little substantive difference in the bounds across the two sub-samples. In other words,
there is little evidence of any salient interaction between WTO membership and FDI
inflows as it concerns political corruption. When we split the sample by FDI net outflows
as a percent of GDP (Table 7), we obtain two interesting results. First, we are never able
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to sign the ATE in the sub-sample with high FDI outflows. As a result, under the
assumptions considered here, we cannot conclude that formal WTO membership has any
effect on political corruption in countries with high FDI outflows. This is consistent with
countries with high outflows of FDI having quality governance even in the absence of
formal WTO membership.36 Second, we find strong evidence of an adverse effect of the
WTO on political corruption in countries with low FDI outflows. With no
misclassification, the 95% confidence interval is [−0.680, −0.179] under MTS-MIV. Thus,
formal WTO membership causes at least an 18 percentage point increase in political
corruption in countries with low FDI outflows. Moreover, even allowing for moderate
misclassification (𝑄 = 0.05), the estimated bounds still exclude zero; the 95% confidence
interval does not. This is consistent with poor governance in countries with low FDI
outflows and this being exacerbated by WTO membership.

4.2.1.3 Firm Ownership
In Table 8 we split the sample into government owned and non-government
owned firms. Panel I (Panel II) displays the results for the sub-sample of government
(non-government) owned firms. The results point to important interactions between firm
type, WTO membership, and political corruption. Specifically, we find that our full sample
results are driven by government-owned firms. Specifically, the 95% confidence intervals
for the expected effect of formal WTO membership (𝑄 = 0) is [−0.547, −0.022] in this
sub-sample under MTS-MIV, whereas the corresponding interval for non-governmentowned firms includes zero. Moreover, the point estimates of the bounds continue to
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Wei (2000) finds that more ‘naturally’ open' economies exhibit better governance, where natural openness
reflects attributes like geography that promote integration into world markets. Moreover, gravity models
for FDI flows shows that such flows respond to the same attributes (e.g., Millimet and Roy 2016).
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exclude zero for government-owned firms even with 𝑄 = 0.05; however, the 95%
confidence intervals include zero when 𝑄 ≥ 0.03. This result, in combination with results
in countries with high entry regulation, is consistent with Djankov et al. (2002). There,
the authors (p. 26) find that high entry regulation is associated with higher corruption in
a sample that includes businesses led by politicians since the entry regulation produces a
"double benefit." First, it generates profits for successful market entrants (including those
that are government-owned). Second, it generates opportunities for rent extraction by the
government.
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Table 8. Sharp Bounds on the ATE of WTO Membership on Corruption: Firm Ownership (Government vs.
Non-Government)
Assumptions Regarding Selection
Q

Exogenous Selection

Worst-Case

MTS

MTS & MIV

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

I. Government Ownership
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

[ -0.049, -0.049] p.e.

[ -0.528, 0.472] p.e.

[ -0.528, -0.049] p.e.

[ -0.512, -0.103] p.e.

[ -0.115, 0.015] CI

[ -0.559, 0.504] CI

[ -0.559, 0.015] CI

[ -0.547, -0.022] CI

[ -0.067, -0.027] p.e.

[ -0.538, 0.482] p.e.

[ -0.538, -0.027] p.e.

[ -0.520, -0.085] p.e.

[ -0.133, 0.037] CI

[ -0.569, 0.514] CI

[ -0.569, 0.037] CI

[ -0.555, -0.001] CI

[ -0.107, 0.017] p.e.

[ -0.558, 0.502] p.e.

[ -0.558, 0.017] p.e.

[ -0.537, -0.045] p.e.

[ -0.170, 0.079] CI

[ -0.589, 0.534] CI

[ -0.589, 0.079] CI

[ -0.572, 0.027] CI

[ -0.148, 0.062] p.e.

[ -0.578, 0.522] p.e.

[ -0.578, 0.062] p.e.

[ -0.553, -0.005] p.e.

[ -0.211, 0.122] CI

[ -0.609, 0.554] CI

[ -0.609, 0.122] CI

[ -0.588, 0.065] CI

[ 0.037, 0.037] p.e.

[ -0.592, 0.408] p.e.

[ -0.592, 0.037] p.e.

[ -0.586, -0.017] p.e.

[ 0.015, 0.060] CI

[ -0.603, 0.419] CI

[ -0.603, 0.060] CI

[ -0.599, 0.013] CI

[ 0.022, 0.077] p.e.

[ -0.602, 0.418] p.e.

[ -0.602, 0.077] p.e.

[ -0.597, 0.013] p.e.

[ 0.000, 0.100] CI

[ -0.613, 0.429] CI

[ -0.613, 0.100] CI

[ -0.607, 0.049] CI

[ -0.010, 0.165] p.e.

[ -0.622, 0.438] p.e.

[ -0.622, 0.165] p.e.

[ -0.618, 0.080] p.e.

[ -0.035, 0.189] CI

[ -0.633, 0.449] CI

[ -0.633, 0.189] CI

[ -0.628, 0.119] CI

[ -0.048, 0.266] p.e.

[ -0.642, 0.458] p.e.

[ -0.642, 0.266] p.e.

[ -0.634, 0.152] p.e.

[ -0.075, 0.292] CI

[ -0.653, 0.469] CI

[ -0.653, 0.292] CI

[ -0.644, 0.181] CI

II. Non-Government Ownership
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

Notes: p.e. = point estimates; CI = confidence interval. Imbens-Manski (2004) 95% CIs obtained using 100
bootstrap repetitions. Q = maximum rate of misclassification of WTO status. Assumptions of no false
positives and positive selection are imposed. Outcome equals one if a firm reports never paying a bribe, zero
otherwise. MIV is GDP per capita. Number of observations = 1007 (Panel I), 7624 (Panel II). See text for
further details.

Our finding is also consistent with government-owned firms responding
differently than private firms to the foreign competition effect. As stated previously, one
possible explanation for our baseline result using the full sample is that an increase in
import competition, instead of reducing rents and hence bribery, may induce an increase
in bribery in an effort to remain competitive, particularly by ‘laggard’' firms in the sense
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of Aghion et al. (2005). Because government owned firms may face different objectives
(see, e.g., Choe and Yin 2000), they may be more likely to be technologically deficient
relative to their non-government owned counterparts and, hence, react to an increase on
product market competition differently.

4.2.1.4 Exporting Firms
Our final source of heterogeneity is the export status of firms. In Table 9
we split the sample into exporting (Panel I) and non-exporting (Panel II) firms.
Interestingly, we find little substantive difference in the bounds across the two subsamples. In other words, there is no evidence that WTO membership differentially impact
the bribery propensity of exporting and non-exporting firms.
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Table 9. Sharp Bounds on the ATE of WTO Membership on Corruption: Exporting Firms (Exporters vs.
Non-Exporters)
Assumptions Regarding Selection
Q

Exogenous Selection

Worst-Case

MTS

MTS & MIV

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

I. Exporters
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

[ -0.021, -0.021] p.e.

[ -0.632, 0.368] p.e.

[ -0.632, -0.021] p.e.

[ -0.618, -0.069] p.e.

[ -0.061, 0.026] CI

[ -0.648, 0.385] CI

[ -0.648, 0.026] CI

[ -0.639, -0.004] CI

[ -0.046, 0.033] p.e.

[ -0.642, 0.378] p.e.

[ -0.642, 0.033] p.e.

[ -0.626, -0.039] p.e.

[ -0.090, 0.082] CI

[ -0.658, 0.395] CI

[ -0.658, 0.082] CI

[ -0.647, 0.030] CI

[ -0.110, 0.161] p.e.

[ -0.662, 0.398] p.e.

[ -0.662, 0.161] p.e.

[ -0.642, 0.025] p.e.

[ -0.161, 0.222] CI

[ -0.678, 0.415] CI

[ -0.678, 0.222] CI

[ -0.663, 0.107] CI

[ -0.194, 0.330] p.e.

[ -0.682, 0.418] p.e.

[ -0.682, 0.330] p.e.

[ -0.658, 0.056] p.e.

[ -0.263, 0.362] CI

[ -0.698, 0.434] CI

[ -0.698, 0.362] CI

[ -0.679, 0.174] CI

[ 0.014, 0.014] p.e.

[ -0.557, 0.443] p.e.

[ -0.557, 0.014] p.e.

[ -0.557, -0.054] p.e.

[ -0.012, 0.043] CI

[ -0.570, 0.461] CI

[ -0.570, 0.043] CI

[ -0.569, -0.013] CI

[ 0.001, 0.046] p.e.

[ -0.567, 0.453] p.e.

[ -0.567, 0.046] p.e.

[ -0.567, -0.019] p.e.

[ -0.026, 0.074] CI

[ -0.580, 0.471] CI

[ -0.580, 0.074] CI

[ -0.579, 0.020] CI

[ -0.029, 0.113] p.e.

[ -0.587, 0.473] p.e.

[ -0.587, 0.113] p.e.

[ -0.587, 0.032] p.e.

[ -0.056, 0.140] CI

[ -0.600, 0.491] CI

[ -0.600, 0.140] CI

[ -0.597, 0.072] CI

[ -0.060, 0.185] p.e.

[ -0.607, 0.493] p.e.

[ -0.607, 0.185] p.e.

[ -0.603, 0.084] p.e.

[ -0.088, 0.212] CI

[ -0.620, 0.511] CI

[ -0.620, 0.212] CI

[ -0.613, 0.123] CI

II. Non-Exporters
0.00

0.01

0.03

0.05

Notes: p.e. = point estimates; CI = confidence interval. Imbens-Manski (2004) 95% CIs obtained using 100
bootstrap repetitions. Q = maximum rate of misclassification of WTO status. Assumptions of no false
positives and positive selection are imposed. Outcome equals one if a firm reports never paying a bribe, zero
otherwise. MIV is GDP per capita. Number of observations = 3061 (Panel I), 5428 (Panel II). See text for
further details.

4.2.2

Future Formal WTO Membership
In the interest of brevity, we do not show the sub-sample results from the

second treatment (future formal WTO membership relative to never becoming a formal
member), but briefly highlight some noticeable differences.37 First, whereas the increase

37

Sub-sample results for the second treatment are available upon request.
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in political corruption due to formal WTO membership occurs predominantly in countries
with high market entry regulations (regardless of empirical measure), the increase in
political corruption due to future formal WTO membership occurs predominantly in
countries with high market entry regulation as measured solely by the time involved in
starting a new business. Second, whereas the ATE bounds for formal WTO membership
are unaffected by FDI inflows, the increase in political corruption due to future formal
WTO membership occurs predominantly in countries with high FDI inflows. Finally,
whereas the increase in political corruption due to formal WTO membership is driven by
government owned firms and equally by exporters and non-exporters, the increase in
political corruption due to future formal WTO membership (i.e., during the accession
phase) is mainly attributable to non-government owned and exporting firms. This is
consistent with these firms attempting to influence on-going accession negotiations. In
sum, while the full sample ATE bounds are similar across the two treatments, the sources
of political corruption differ during the accession and membership phases.
5

Conclusion
Referring to general international integration, Sandholtz and Gray (2003, p.

767) suggest that the "more a country is involved in international organizations, the more
likely its elites are to have absorbed some of the anticorruption norms, and the lower the
level of corruption should be." Espousing similar view, but referring specifically to the
WTO, Aaronson and Abouharb (2014, p. 579) claim that "the WTO is, without direct
intent, having some effects on governance." Thus, there is a fairly widespread belief that
participation in the WTO helps improve overall governance and institutions among
member countries; or, at least, it does not harm.
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The two possible underlying mechanisms are the liberalization of trade, and
its associated benefits, and policy anchoring. However, the empirical evidence regarding
these is mixed and typically lacks a causal interpretation. Moreover, the causal impact of
WTO status on corruption is (to our knowledge) an unanswered question. We provide an
answer by applying a nonparametric partial identification approach to circumvent issues
of self-selection and misclassification of membership status. We obtain sharp bounds on
the ATE of WTO status on corruption under various assumptions concerning the selection
process and measurement error. For this, we use firm-level corruption data from the
WBES (1999-2000) that reports firm managers' direct experiences of paying bribes to
public officials in the course of business operations. Further, we explore various sources
of possible heterogeneity by bounding conditional ATEs using several country- and firmspecific attributes.
The results are quite striking. First, accession to and formal membership in
the WTO is likely to exacerbate political corruption, in contrast to the usual rhetoric.
Specifically, in the full sample, the ATE bounds exclude zero in the absence of
misclassification but under otherwise reasonable assumptions. Because there is no
misclassification of formal WTO membership, this implies that formal membership

increases corruption. Because there is also no misclassification in future formal WTO
membership, our analysis also implies that future formal membership increases corruption.
However, we cannot rule out the possibility that the ATEs are zero under modest
misclassification. In other words, countries acting as WTO members despite not actually
being formal members or countries incorrectly classified as in the accession process
precludes our ability to sign the ATEs in the full sample. Second, the evidence in favor of
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an increase in political corruption due to formal WTO membership is driven by countries
having high market entry regulations for firms, countries with low net outflows of FDI,
and government owned firms. Third, the evidence in favor of an increase in political
corruption due to future formal WTO membership (i.e., during the accession phase) is
driven by countries having high market entry regulations for firms as measured by the
time involved in starting a new business, countries with high net inflows of FDI and low
net outflows of FDI, and non-government owned or exporting firms. Thus, the sources of
the increase in political corruption differ during the accession and membership phases.
In sum, our analysis reveals at best a small, beneficial effect of WTO
membership on reducing corruption; accession and membership are most likely to

exacerbate corruption unless misclassification is present. Moreover, even with
misclassification, WTO status is likely to exacerbate corruption in certain sub-samples.
This is consistent with Keohane et al. (2009, p. 27) who state that "there are good reasons
to be concerned that multilateralism can sometimes empower unaccountable elites -- a
tendency against which it is necessary to guard." It is also consistent with WTO
membership altering the composition of entrepreneurs towards those with a greater
propensity to engage in bribery.
To conclude, we believe our analysis to provide convincing causal evidence
indicating that WTO accession and membership may not improve the quality of
governance as often postulated. While this is not necessarily an indictment of the WTO
-- it was not, after all, designed to combat domestic political corruption -- it should serve
as a warning to policymakers against relying on international organizations such as the
WTO for improved governance. Moreover, the findings here ought to spur the
60

development of richer, theoretical models of corruption to better understand the sources
of important interactions between WTO status, corruption, and the domestic economic
environment.
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CHAPTER 3

Regulation and U.S. State-Level Corruption
Abstract: I exploit a panel data set on U.S. for the time span 1990 - 2013 to evaluate the

causal impact of government regulation on bureaucratic corruption. Despite the stylized
fact that corruption and regulation are positively correlated, there is a lack of empirical
evidence to substantiate a causal relationship. Using novel data on federal regulation of
industries (Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin 2015), and convictions of public o¢cials from the
Public Integrity Section, I apply a stochastic frontier approach to account for one-sided
measurement error in bureaucratic corruption and the Lewbel (2012) identification
strategy to control for potential endogeneity of regulation. Results are striking. Based on
the preferred model, there is evidence of endogeneity of regulation and absence of a causal
link between regulation and corruption. However, if any of the above two econometric
issues are ignored, evidence of a spurious relationship between corruption and regulation
is found.

1

Introduction
A stylized fact in the literature of corruption and regulation is that

economies with stricter regulation have higher corruption (Djankov et al. 2002). It is a
longstanding belief that "it is the regulatory state with its elaborate system of permits
and licenses that spawns corruption, and different countries with different degrees of
insertion of the regulatory state in the economy give rise to varying amounts of
corruption," (Bardhan 1997, p. 1330). More regulations in an economy increase the
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frequency of interaction between bureaucrats and citizens. This in turn raises the
probability for bureaucrats to engage in corrupt practices. Referring to this, Tanzi (1998,
p. 10) states: "The existence of regulations and authorizations gives a kind of monopoly
power to the officials who must authorize or inspect the activity...they can use their public
power to extract bribes from those who need the authorizations or permits."
Intensive regulatory constraints also incentivize firms to offer bribes to
bureaucrats to avoid such compliances. As Kaufmann and Wei (1999, p. 1) explain:
"Excessive taxes and regulation on the books (nominal red tape) would remain excessive
without bribery; but with the possibility of bribery, they may be transformed to less "real"
red tape (i.e., officials not enforcing all the rules and regulations in exchange for bribes)."
Along the same line, Holcombe and Boudreaux (2015, p. 77) state: "Regulation, by its
nature, is designed to keep people from making choices they would have made in the
absence of the regulation. That supplies incentives for people to engage in activities that
generate regulatory benefits for themselves, or avoid regulatory costs..." Despite such
widespread opinion on regulation spurring corruption, existing studies have not credibly
established this as a causal relationship. In this paper, I attempt to answer whether
government regulation has a causal effect on bureaucratic corruption.
In the U.S., several instances of public officials being convicted of bribery -- in exchange for business favors --- are recorded in the annual reports of the Public
Integrity Section (PIN) of the Department of Justice (discussed later in section 2.2.1). As
such, a number of anecdotes indicate regulation to induce corrupt practices among
government personnel in the U.S.
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Additionally, given the regulatory trends in the U.S. for the last four
decades, the question addressed in this paper is reasonable and timely. In an article of
December 14, 2010, the Pew Research Center documents that almost 67% of Americans
in 1981 thought that the "government had gone too far in regulating business."38 However,
between 1980-1994, the financial institutions suffered massively due to waves of
deregulation (Hanc, 1997). Historically, the most prominent period of deregulation is
known to be during the Reagan Administration when substantial deregulation was
promoted in agriculture and transportation sectors also, along with decentralization of
environmental policy.39 Some deregulation efforts, however, had begun under President
Carter like that in the airline and trucking industry (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). The spell
continued under the first President Bush and President Clinton.40 In contrast, a significant
increase in the regulatory burden was seen during the tenures of the second President
Bush and President Obama. According to the Heritage Foundation, the annual regulatory
cost increased by nearly $30 billion in the Bush years (March 2008 article) 41 and $108
billion during the Obama Administration when 229 major regulations were imposed (May

38

http://www.pewresearch.org/2010/12/14/reagans-recession/

39

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) budget was cut by almost 22% during this time and the
Clean Air Act regulation was relaxed. The total number of employees at EPA was also reduced. These
actions, however, generated discontent among environmentalists. Also see,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency. See,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deregulation#United_States.
40

For example, that in the electricity sector in 1992 and the Gramm-Leach_Bliley Act that removed
barriers among the banking, insurance and securities companies. See
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1877351_1877350_1877322,00.html.
41

Among this, almost $6.7 billion was from the EPA, $1.4 billion from the Department of Homeland Security
and $985 million per year from the Department of Transportation's rules for automobiles. See
http://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/report/red-tape-rising-regulatory-trends-the-bush-years.
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2016 article).42 As opposed to these, the present Trump Administration works towards
rolling back regulatory constraints. On January 30, 2017, President Trump signed an
executive order stating that "for every one new regulation issued, at least two prior
regulations be identified for elimination," (The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary).43 In the light of such facts, it is tenable to ask how the swings in regulatory
regimes impact corruption across states.
At this point, one may question the rationale behind analyzing corruption
in a developed country like the U.S., where such a prevalence is known to be less rampant
than that in poor or developing countries. Countering such common thoughts, Johnson et
al. (2014, p. 54) argue that "corruption could play the same role in a developed as in a
developing country if government displays the features of rigidity, overcentralization, and
sclerosis due to excessive regulation." Reinforcing this argument, Graeff and Mehlkop
(2003, p. 609) point out, though debatable, that the type of corrupt practices may differ
across rich versus poor countries due to their differences in culture and history; the
magnitude may also be less in the former. Nevertheless, developed countries have their
own forms of corruption as opposed to "traditional" kinds of developing nations. In other
words, it is often argued that bribing a street level official to evade a regulation and/or
to expedite a regulatory process is a common practice in less developed countries. In this
case, bribes essentially smooth the way for a citizen or a firm amidst strict regulations. In
42

Some of the pertinent policies were the EPA's Clean Power Plan, the "sweeping" Dodd-Frank financial
regulatory reform (The Washington Independent, July 2010) and the Affordable Care Act that extended
coverage of uninsured families.
43

See, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/30/presidential-executive-order-reducingregulation-and-controlling. Also, on August 12, 2017, Politics reported that the Trump Administration has
rolled back "dozens of environmental regulations" and efforts to repeal few other reforms like Dodd-Frank
and Affordable Care Act have been initiated in March and June 2017, respectively.
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contrast, bribes in the developed nations are more likely to be offered to bureaucrats to
receive a benefit in return, for example, to win contracts pertaining to that of construction,
defense, etc. (Rose-Ackermann, 1999).
Regardless of its nature, "corruption is not a problem only in developing
countries but exists in the United States and varies significantly from state to state,"
(Apergis et al. 2012, p. 217). This is further validated by the Corruption Perception Index
(CPI) of Transparency International (TI). Figure 1 shows the CPI score for the year 2016
across the world. U.S. ranks at number 18 with a score of 74 on a scale of 0 (most corrupt)
- 100 (cleanest). It is worth highlighting that other OECD (Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development) countries like Sweden, Finland, United Kingdom,
Belgium --- that rank much lower than the U.S. in terms of Human Development Index
(HDI) --- score higher in CPI, thereby implying that these countries are performing better
than the U.S. in terms of combating corruption. Also, a non-OECD country like Uruguay
enjoys a CPI score that is not very low from that of the U.S. Evidently, corruption in the
U.S. and its variation across states are not ignorable aspects (see also Figures 3 and 7
discussed later).
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As stated above, the relationship between regulation and corruption is often
assumed to be positive. However, the theoretical relationship between regulation and
corruption is obscure. Various theories related to this topic have contrasting predictions
suggesting a bidirectional causal relationship (discussed in section 2.1.1). Interestingly,
empirical evidence on the association between regulation and corruption is also
inconclusive. While the causal link remains nearly unexplored, researchers find evidence
for regulation and corruption to be correlated in both positive and negative ways
(discussed in section 2.1.2). As far as the U.S. economy is concerned in particular, Apergis
et al. (2012) find regulation to be positively correlated with corruption.44

44

Several papers, including Apergis et al. (2012) use Economic Freedom index as a proxy for regulatory
measure. To be precise, absence of economic freedom is interpreted as intrusive regulatory practices in an
economy. This is further elaborated in section 2.2.
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Given this background, evaluating empirically whether regulation causes
corruption is crucial. To this end, Graeff and Mehlkop (2003, p. 614) point out that
majority of public officials who are possibly corruptible, do not have the power to create
new regulations for the benefit of their corrupt partners. They are only endowed with
enough power to misconstrue the existing regulation in favor of their partners in
corruption. Thus, the authors state: "[I]t is more appropriate to investigate the influence
of state regulation on corruption than the opposite direction of causality." Nevertheless,
to the best of my knowledge, empirical research on this is notably scant and restricted to
cross-country analysis alone (for e.g., Goel 2012, Duvanova 2014). And as known, crosscountry analyses typically plague from considerable heterogeneity in samples (Jonhson et
al. 2014, Malesky et al. 2015).
Here, I exploit a panel data set on U.S. for the time span 1990 - 2013 to
credibly evaluate the causal impact of government regulation on corruption. For
corruption, I use the widely used conviction data from the PIN. For regulation, I use novel
data on federal regulation of industries --- namely RegData --- that was introduced by AlUbaydli and McLaughlin (2015). RegData is disaggregated at the two-, three-, and fourdigit level of industrial code as per the North American Industrial Classification System
(NAICS). It is the first panel dataset on federal-level industry-specific regulations. I
convert this national, industry-level data into state-level measure to make it conformable
with the state-level corruption data. For this, I use historical industrial composition of
states following other literatures like Topalova (2010), Autor et al. (2013) and Lake and
Millimet (2016). This process enables to create a measure that varies both within- and
between-state due to the spatial variation in industry composition.
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While exploiting such a rich panel data set to estimate the causal effect is
advantageous, achieving identification in the current context is econometrically
challenging for several reasons. To begin with, the most well-known problem in studies
related to corruption is its corresponding unobservable form. Actual level of corruption,
due to its illicit nature, is never observed. To be specific, given the particular nature of
the conviction data used in this analysis, bureaucratic corruption is under-reported. Thus,
observed bureaucratic corruption suffers from a ‘non-classical’' measurement error
problem as the measurement error in the dependent variable is strictly non-negative or

one-sided in nature. Moreover, this under-representation of bureaucratic corruption is
likely to vary across states contingent on some state-specific characteristics (for example,
political environment of a state). As a result, this one-sided measurement error is
presumably heteroskedastic. If a one-sided and heteroskedastic measurement error in a
dependent variable is ignored, then estimates are biased and inconsistent.
The next challenge in such an empirical exercise arises from the likelihood
of regulation to be not strictly exogenous. Kaufmann and Wei (1999, p. 2) explain that a
country's bureaucrats usually have enough discretionary power with respect to a
regulatory process such that they "often ‘customize’' the nature and amount of
harassment on firms to extract maximum bribes possible." Thus, potential endogeneity of
regulation is a major concern due to possibility of reverse causation, omitted variable bias
and measurement error in regulation (discussed in detail in section 3.2). Given these, the
traditional technique of fixed effects (FE) is not likely to be a credible solution. Besides,
finding a traditional instrumental variable for regulation is almost impossible given the
various complexities associated with studies related to corruption and regulation.
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In my current analysis, I circumvent the first issue of one-sided measurement
error in bureaucratic corruption by explicitly modeling this error term via a stochastic
frontier approach. This approach is commonly applied in the literature of productivity
analysis to account for technical and cost inefficiencies (see, for example, Greene 2005).
However, to the best of my knowledge, only a few researchers to date have applied this
technique to account for the particular econometric problem of one-sided measurement
error in the dependent variable (see Millimet 2017).
To control for the second issue of potential endogeneity of regulation, I apply
the Lewbel (2012) identification strategy. This recently developed methodology exploits
conditional second moments of the data to generate valid instruments within a model in
the absence of traditional instrumental variables. In the recent past, several researchers
have applied the Lewbel (2012) approach to attain identification in varied contexts where
traditional instruments are difficult to obtain (e.g., Choudhury 2015, Millimet and Roy
2016, Caliendo et al. 2017). I complement the applications of both these techniques --stochastic frontier approach and Lewbel (2012) approach --- with detailed intuitive
explanations as relevant in the current context.
The key findings of my analysis are striking. I find evidence of endogeneity
of regulation and absence of a causal link between regulation and corruption. The key to
obtaining this no causal effect is the careful consideration of the two econometric issues
discussed above while conducting the causal analysis. If either the one-sided measurement
error in bureaucratic corruption or the potential endogeneity of regulation is ignored, then
evidence of a spurious relationship between corruption and regulation is found.
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To be specific, if none of the two issues are accounted for and a
straightforward traditional FE model is applied instead, then a positive association
between corruption and regulation is found, though statistically insignificant. If one
ignores the issue of potential endogeneity of regulation, then a mere stochastic frontier
estimate is statistically significant with a positive sign implying an increase in corruption
due to an increase in regulatory laws. If one ignores the one-sided measurement error in
corruption, then again, there is evidence of a statistically significant relationship but with
a negative sign, implying a decrease in corruption with an increase in regulatory
constraint.
These results are in sharp contrast to my preferred estimate of −0.011 in
the comprehensive model where all the above-discussed econometric issues are controlled
for. First, the impact is not statistically significant. Second, although one cannot rule out
a zero effect, −0.011, by far, represents the best estimate available to understand the
relationship between regulation and corruption and magnitude of the impact, however
small. It indicates that a one standard deviation increase in regulatory contraints is
associated with a 1.3% decrease in bureaucratic corruption. This not only contradicts
with the above set of evidence that result from naive estimation strategies to investigate
the causal effect, this also is in sharp contrast to the prior finding of a positive and
statistically significant association between regulation and corruption in the U.S. (see
Apergis et al. 2012).
To move on with the details of my analysis, I organize the remainder of the
paper as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 presents the data and
the empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
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2

Literature Review
My analysis mainly contributes to two broad strands of literature. The first

comprises of studies related to regulation and corruption in general, while the second
refers specifically to corruption in the U.S.

2.1

Regulation and Corruption
I first discuss various theories related to the potential association between

regulation and corruption. This is followed by relevant empirical studies in this area.
2.1.1

Theoretical Background
The relevant literature can be broadly classified in two categories: Public

Interest Theory and Public Choice Theory. Public Interest Theory dates back to Pigou
(1938). This assumes government to be a benevolent agent who works in the interest of
the public. Here, government intervens in the market to protect public from damaging
externalities and monopoly power that may arise in absence of regulations. Hence,
regulation is imposed with a welfare enhancing purpose that eventually increase
competition in the market and reduce socially inferior outcomes, particularly corruption
(Djankov et al. 2002).
However, Bliss and Di Tella (1997) show that the effect of competition on
corruption is, in fact, ambiguous. The outcome depends on various factors. A bureaucrat's
decision to extract rents may depend on the cost structure of a firm that he deals with
and various uncertainties associated with this. When competition is low in the market, it
is easier for a bureaucrat to enjoy considerable control over a few firms. This enables him
to extort big amount of grafts from each of those few firms. But amidst intense
competition, there is a trade off between extorting big amounts of rents from a firm at
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the margin, and forcing its exit from the market. However, a smaller amount of graft in
such an instance from each firm may actually sum up to a bigger amount in total. Alluding
to this, Ades and Di Tella (1999) point out that more competition implies less rents
available to firms to offer as bribes. This, therefore, leads to lesser corruption.
Nevertheless, intense competition makes monitoring bureaucrats more challenging. Thus,
it is easier for a bureaucrat to engage in corrupt practices when the competition is high.
Given these arguments, the final impact on corruption due to an increase in competition
is uncertain.
Public Choice Theory, on the other hand, assumes that government is less
benign and regulation is socially inefficient. The two school of thoughts associated with
this theory are known as the Capture Theory, and the Tollbooth Theory. Capture Theory
was first established in the seminal paper of Stigler (1971). It argues that corruption

causes regulation because the latter is imposed to benefit the elite. That is, industries
influence government by offering bribes to impose regulations that would be beneficial to
them, for example, lobbying or paying bribes to elicit regulations that restrict imports. In
contrast, Tollbooth theory (McChesney 1987, Shleifer and Vishny 1993) predicts

regulation to cause corruption where the government (the regulators themselves) imposes
stricter regulation to create greater opportunities for themselves to extract rents from
firms. Both these theories essentially have the same underlying assumption that a special
interest group advocates for more regulation for its own benefit.
Several researchers follow up these theories by presenting different
variations. Readers are referred to Spiller (1990), Acemoglu (2008) and Caselli and
Gennaioli (2008) for studies focusing on the Capture theory. Djankov (2009) also provides
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a good review. Studies related to Tollbooth and Public Interest theory show that
misgovernance is a possible outcome even in the presence of a benevolent government.
Conflict of interests between government and its agents, discretion exercised by agents -- on behalf of the principal --- for his own advantage, inability of a rational benevolent
principal to provide incentives to bureaucrats to deter from such acts, proportion of
corrupt officials present in an organization are some of the reasons behind such a
possibility (see, Banerjee 1997, Klitgaard 1991, Guriev 2004, and Ahlin and Bose 2007).
To sum up, from theoretical perspective, the direction of causality between
regulation and corruption is ambiguous with considerable reasons to believe that the
relationship may be two-way.
2.1.2

Empirical Background
Empirical studies investigating the relationship between regulation and

corruption is extensive. That said, barring a few notable exceptions, extant studies focus
mainly on correlation and not causation. Using firm-level survey data from Global
Competitiveness Report and World Development Report, Kaufmann and Wei (1999) show
a positive association between bribery and red tape; La Porta et al. (1999) find more
corrupt countries to experience greater bureaucratic delays; Breen and Gillanders (2012)
show that it is not the quantity, but the quality of regulation that matters by using proxy
from the World Bank’s Doing Business data.
Using regulation of entry for firms as a regulatory measure, a substantial
number of studies find economies with greater state intervention have higher level of
corruption (Treisman 2000, Djankov et al. 2002, Svensson 2005). In contrast to this, Berg
et al. (2012, p. 23, 35) find that ‘regulatory governance’ and ‘regulatory substance’' deter
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corrupt practices between customers and service providers in telecommunication sector
across developing countries. This effect is more pronounced in countries with greater
competition and state-owned enterprises. While regulatory governance is defined as the
formal or legal design and creation of regulatory constraints, regulatory substance
represents the "actual decisions made by the regulator." Even though this study attempts
to control for potential endogeneity of regulation, the authors express concern about the
validity of the instruments used and therefore, interpret their two-stage least square
results as "as merely a sensitivity test rather than the true causal effects of regulation on
corruption."
Along similar line, Goel (2012) and Duvanova (2014) aim for a causal
analysis. Goel (2012) applies a two-stage least square estimation strategy to estimate the
impact of tax and business regulation on cross-country corruption. The author
instruments for some of the regulation proxies (from World Bank’s Doing Business survey)
used in his analysis while presenting an argument for why the left out proxies are likely
to be strictly exogenous in the study. Yet, absent any justification for why the chosen
instruments are likely to be valid instruments in the specific context, relying on these
variables seems precarious. Besides, lack of complete information about the performances
of the instruments magnifies the dubiousness.45 The main results, nevertheless, suggest an
increase in corruption due to an increment in number of procedures and time involved
across various regulatory categories. On the other hand, Duvanova (2014) defines these
regulatory proxies as the de jure regulation of a country, whereas de facto regulatory

45

In this study, only first-stage F-statistic and Sargan's over-identification tests for the instruments used
are reported. See Goel (2012) for details.
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proxies are taken from various measures reported in the Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) for 25 East European countries. 46 The author
controls for potential selection bias in her analysis via Heckman Selection model and finds
the impact of de facto regulation to be positive and statistically significant on corruption,
unlike that of de jure regulation. This result validates the hypothesis that actual
implementation of regulation is more crucial than official regulatory policy.
In addition to this, several researchers have used economic freedom indices
instead to capture the degree of state intervention. Specifically, absence of economic
freedom is considered as a proxy for intrusive regulatory practice by government.47
Lambsdorff (2007) presents a good review of studies exploring the relationship between
economic freedom and corruption. Majority of the pertinent studies find a negative
association between economic freedom index and corruption (Goldsmith 1999, Paldam
2002, Saha et al. 2009, Goel and Nelson 2010, Kaymak and Bektas 2015, Holcombe and
Bodreaux 2015).48 As for the U.S. economy in particular is concerned, Apergis et al. (2012)
use the Fraser Institute's index to evaluate the relationship between corruption
convictions and economic freedom via a panel error correction model. The authors
reportedly find a negative and statistically significant relationship.

46

For example, percentage of senior management's time per year spent in dealing with government officials
about the application and interpretation of laws and regulations, or how problematic are the following for
the operation/growth of your business: licensing, customs, labor, foreign currency, environmental,
fire/safety, tax administration.
47

More economic freedom entails intense competition among firms which eventually reduces corruption
(Lambsdorff 2005). For cross country analyses, three most common economic freedom indices used by are:
Heritage Foundation, Freedom House and Fraser Institute.
48

This is consistent with the positive correlation reported between regulation and corruption in most of the
studies discussed above.
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As opposed to these, few studies reveal that lack of government regulation,
as captured by more economic freedom, may be associated with greater corruption. Graeff
and Mehlkop (2003, p. 611, 615) find that for rich countries, greater freedom may lead to
an increase in corrupt practices. The authors explain this "unexpected result" as some
regulatory constraints in richer economies to be responsible for increasing the transaction
cost of "illegal bargains," thereby reducing corruption on greater state intervention. On
the contrary, Pieroni and d'Agostino (2013) find that lack of regulation increases
corruption in less developed countries like African and transition economies. In a free
market, high transaction costs for selling heterogeneous goods and services may be avoided
by firms by paying bribes. But, such acts can be controlled by government regulations.
Using the 1999-2000 World Business Environment Survey (WBES) data, the authors show
that for less developed countries, corruption arising from high transaction cost in a free
market outweighs the cost of corruption arising from bureaucratic powers in presence of
regulatory constraints.
To summarize, empirical literature in this area is expansive and ongoing.49
While the majority of studies find intrusive regulation to be associated with greater
corruption, few studies do find contradictory evidence, thereby implying that the causal

49

Alongside the above mentioned studies, other research reveal that the relationship between corruption
and various other factors --- for example, private investment, membership to international organizations,
technical inefficiency, bureaucratic delays in policy implementation, international entrepreneurship --- get
exacerbated in presence of cumbersome regulatory practices in an economy (Mauro 1995, Méon and Weill
2010, Chowdhury et al. 2015, Freund et al. 2015, Choudhury and Millimet 2017). Complementing these,
researchers show that corruption can be associated with growth and nascent entrepreneurship in a beneficial
way as well when government regulation is intrusive (Heckelman and Powell 2010, Dreher and Gassebner
2013). In this respect, as far as the U.S. economy is concerned, Johnson et al. (2014) find that the negative
association between corruption and growth gets less pronounced in states with more regulation. In other
words, the harmful effect of corruption on growth is less harmful in states that have more regulatory
constraints.
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relationship between regulation and corruption is difficult to ascertain without a careful
and rigorous investigation.

2.2

Corruption in the U.S.
Here, I first present some anecdotes related to regulatory laws and corrupt

activities of public officials in the U.S., followed by empirical determinants of corruption
in the economy as found by researchers to date.
2.2.1

Anecdotal Evidence
In a 2013 federal executive branch case, a procurement program manager,

Jose Mendez --- at the U.S. Air Force Foreign Materials Acquisition Support Office
(FMASO) at Hill Air Force Base in Utah --- was found guilty of accepting more than
$180,000 as bribe from a Florida based businessman. Foreign military materials are
supplied to the U.S. government through FMASO. Mendez ensured that the businessman
received favorable treatment to obtain procurement contracts with FMASO while
providing him with contract bid and other relevant information before the award of the
procurement contracts (PIN Report, 2013).50 A similar case was reported in 2012 involving
a bribery amount of $24 million in exchange for manipulation of bid and award of
contracts to certain contractors at a U.S. military base in Kuwait between 2005 and
2006.51 According to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) system, disclosure of bids,

50

Also see http://geyergorey.com/tag/u-s-air-force-foreign-materials-acquisition-support-office-fmaso/

51

U.S. Army Sergeant First Class, Richard Evick, was convicted in 2012 for accepting nearly $24 million,
along with his accomplice. Evick, in the role of the Army's Non-Commissioned Officer, was in charge of
arranging the award for valuable contracts that involved supply of bottled water, catering services to the
U.S. military, maintaining Army barracks and installing security barriers. In exchange of the bribe, Evick
manipulated the contracting process in multiple ways, including acceptance of fake bids (PIN Report, 2012).
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/army-sergeant-and-associate-convicted-all-counts-roles-bribery-andmoney-laundering-scheme
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proposal information or any related information, and/or preferential treatment are
regarded as violations of law. The FAR system sets rules and regulations for the
acquisition process of goods and services by the executive branch of the federal
government (Title 48, Chapter 1 of the Code of Federal Regulations). Part Three of the
FAR states: "While many Federal laws and regulations place restrictions on the actions
of Government personnel, their official conduct must, in addition, be such that they would
have no reluctance to make a full public disclosure of their actions."52
Indictment of Clearance Walker, a former agent of the Internal Revenue
Service (California), is yet another example. Filing of Currency Transaction Reports
(CTRs) is essential for businesses like liquor stores, groceries stores, and used car
dealerships. This enables the government to track cash transactions that help detecting
tax violations and criminal activities. Walker, who was responsible for monitoring such
compliances, helped the businesses instead to collect around $400,000 as "underground
cash" by not filing and abiding by the CTRs laws (PIN Report, 2004). In another state
and local government case of 2012, two deputy sheriffs reportedly extorted $1500 cash to
protect an illegal gambling business in Starr County, Texas (PIN Report, 2012).
Apart from these, the recent trial against Senator Robert Menendez and
investigation of Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton further raise a flag on this issue. As

The New York Times (September 11, 2017) reports, the case against Senator Menendez
is the "first federal bribery trial against a sitting United States Senator in decades" where
he is accused to have "personally lobbied for visas" to get around the pertinent

52

See https://www.acquisition.gov/browsefar
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immigration rules and regulations in exchange of bribe.53 Texas Attorney General Paxton
is also charged of accepting nearly $100,000 as bribe to cover up a Medicaid fraud
investigation against the CEO of a Texas company (Dallas News, July 2016). It is alleged
that the company violated the requirement of the presence of a physician while providing
services to Medicaid patients.54
To sum up, several cases pertaining to various levels of government officials
provide evidence in favor of the widespread belief that regulatory constraints encourage
corrupt activities among bureaucrats in the U.S.
2.2.2

Empirical Determinants
In the extant literature, most of the "single-country studies" on corruption

are focused on the U.S., barring a few exceptions. And, majority of these empirical
analyses have "almost exclusively employed" the conviction measure of public officials
from the PIN of Criminal Division (Goel and Nelson 2011, p. 156).
Given this, several factors are found to affect corruption in the U.S. These
include per capita income in a state, per capita government revenue or expenditure,
population of a state, income inequality, education status of a state, degree of
urbanization, decentralization of government, citizen ideology, unemployment level in a
state (e.g., Goel and Nelson 1998, Glaeser and Saks 2006, Alt and Lassen 2008, Apergis

53

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/nyregion/robert-menendez-corruption-trialvisas.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FMenendez%2C%20Robert&action=click&contentCollection=
timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=4&pgtype=collect
ion
54

https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas-politics/2017/10/05/texas-ag-ken-paxton-faces-newinvestigation-bribery-statute-100k-gift
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et al. 2012, Alt and Lassen 2014). Beside these, Alt and Lassen (2008) find that a divided
government, elected state supreme court judges instead of appointed, and independent
judicial branch are all associated with lower corruption. This is consistent with the popular
notion that separated political control over legislative and executive branches exert some
checks on their functionings and therefore, maintains a balance. In another study, Goel
and Nelson (2011) show that federal government’s effort to uncover corruption may also
be crucial. The strength of federal enforcement (measured by federal investigation and
enforcement officers per 1000 population) to address such white-collar crime has a positive
and statistically significant impact on corruption. Recently, Alt and Lassen (2014) find
greater prosecutorial resources, allocated to deal with corruption related cases, result in
more convictions. This is consistent with the system capacity theory in criminology. The
authors also find evidence in favor of partisan influence on allocation of these resources.
To summarize, corruption in the U.S. is a widely studied topic with several
researchers investigating various factors that affect such practices among public officials.
Regardless, the empirical question pertaining to the causal link between regulation and
corruption remains unexplored.
3

3.1

Empirics

Data
To facilitate better understanding of the estimation strategy applied, I first

discuss the data utilized to estimate the causal effect of regulation on corruption. To
construct the necessary variables, I pool together data from multiple sources. Definition
of the variables used and their sources are reported in Table A1. Summary statistics are
presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variables

N

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Dependent Variable
Bureaucratic Corruption

1194

0.06

0.05

0.00

0.41

Main Explanatory Variable
Regulation

1200

3.83

1.15

1.75

9.04

State Covariates
Income (in dollars)

1200

16707.12

2922.75

10170.06

27356.95

Ideology

1200

50.14

15.11

8.45

95.97

Income Inequality

1200

0.58

0.04

0.52

0.71

Education

1200

82.72

5.70

64.30

93.50

Unemployment (in hundreds)

1200

175630.40

232681.90

8074.00

2244326.00

Centralization

1200

0.66

0.08

0.44

1.00

Government Size (in dollars)

1200

3919.79

1201.33

1912.55

12700.09

Divided Government

1200

0.54

0.50

0

1

Urbanization (in thousands)
1200
0.71
0.15
0.32
0.99
Notes: The sample period spans from 1990 to 2013. For constructing bureaucratic corruption, conviction data for the time
period 1991 - 2014 is used. Convictions of (t+1) year is used as a proxy for corruption in the year t for all specifications, except
for robustness check where data from 1991 - 2015 is used (see Table 4). See text for further details. Unemployment and
Urbanization are transformed by multiplying by 100 and 1000 respectively, to avoid blowing up of model convergence.
Definitions and the sources of variables are presented in Table A1.

3.1.1

Bureaucratic Corruption
Data come from the annual reports of the PIN of the Justice Department

(Criminal Division). The Attorney General is required to present an annual report to
Congress on the various activities and operations of the PIN. This includes statistics on
federal convictions of federal, state and local public officials, accused of corruption, for
each state in a given year. Barring a few exceptions, such federal prosecutions are handled
by the local Attorney’s office. The PIN was originally created in 1976 --- in accordance to
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 --- to combat public corruption in the U.S. The
Department of Justice defines public corruption as "crimes involving abuses of the public
trust by government officials" (PIN Report 2015, p. 1).55

55

Convictions are actually presented at the district level for every state in a given year in the annual
reports. For more details about these reports, see, https://www.justice.gov/criminal/pin.
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This conviction data has been widely used by researchers to date (e.g., Goel
and Nelson 1998, Fredriksson et al. 2003, Apergis et al. 2012, Alt and Lassen 2014, Liu
and Mikesell 2014). Liu and Mikesell (2014, p. 351) point out: "The PIN data have a
significant comparative advantage over other available corruption-related indexes in that
they are consistent across time and jurisdictions." Instead of state or local laws, the
conviction data is based on federal laws that are commonly applicable to all relevant
cases. Thus, the conviction measure is consistent across states (Depken and LaFountain
2006). Another important advantage is that the conviction data "does not rely on surveys
or expert opinions" (Alt and Lassen 2014, p. 308). Also see, Glaeser and Saks (2006) and
Apergis et al. (2012) for benefits of using conviction data over any other available
corruption measure.
Nevertheless, this measure is not ideal. The caveats are: there is a ‘timing
issue’' involved and it suffers from one-sided measurement error (see, e.g. Fredriksson et
al. 2003, Apergis et al. 2012). Convictions of public officials usually take place at a much
later date than the time of occurrence of the crime. Thus, it is difficult to infer about the
actual time of the corrupt activity from the conviction measure. I circumvent this issue
by using the conviction measure of the following year as a proxy for current corruption
in my preferred model (i.e., conviction in the year 𝑡 + 1 is used for corruption in year 𝑡).56
To explore the robustness of the result, I re-run the analysis using convictions of (𝑡 + 𝑟)
year for current corruption where 𝑟 ≥ 2. Next, convictions are only observed when a crime
is reported and then, successfully prosecuted based on evidence available. Observed

56

Fredriksson et al. (2003) uses the same strategy to circumvent the timing issue.
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convictions must, therefore, under-represent actual corruption. This gives rise to the
problem of one-sided measurement error. I discuss this in depth in the next section on
estimation strategy. At this point, it is just worth mentioning that a one-sided
measurement error in the dependent variable complicates a causal analysis substantially,
yielding biased and inconsistent estimates if ignored.
Finally, to get the required dependent variable, I normalize the number of
convictions by government employment (sum of state- and local-level employment).57
Bureaucratic corruption is therefore, defined as the total number of convictions of public
officials in a state per 1000 government employees. 58 The sample period spans from 1990
to 2013. So, for a total of 24 years with 50 states in each year, the total number of
observations turn out to be 1194 as six random observations for conviction are missing.
For an overview, Figure 2 shows the trend in bureaucratic corruption in the U.S. over the
sample period and Figure 3 represents heterogeneity across states on average. States like
Montana, Louisiana, Florida, Alabama, Ohio, Pennsylvania rank high in corruption,
whereas Nebraska, Kansas, Utah, Oregon, New Hampshire belong to the bottom quartile.

57

For missing observations of state- and local-level public employment, I impute it by the average of the
previous and the following years' observations. For other papers using public employment to normalize the
conviction measure, see, e.g., Fredriksson et al. (2003). Also, see, e.g., Alt and Lassen (2014) for alternative
measures used for normalization.
58

For current year's measure of bureaucratic corruption, I normalize conviction of year (t+1) by total
public employment of year t.
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3.1.2

Government Regulation
To construct the core explanatory variable Regulation for my analysis, I use

novel data on industry-specific federal regulations, namely RegData.59 This data is
introduced by Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin (2015). RegData is disaggregated at the two,
three, and four-digit industry level codes classified according to the NAICS.
For U.S., prior studies in various contexts majorly use regulatory constraints
in a specific industry or for a small group of related industries (for example, Greenstone
2002, Fredriksson et al. 2003, Millimet and Roy 2016). Though these studies are
consequential, it restricts the scope of an analysis to a particular regulatory context. Some
studies --- for example, Apergis et al. 2012 --- use economic freedom indices instead like
those from Fraser Institute, Cato Institute, etc.60 Few exceptions like Mulligan and Shleifer
(2005), Coffey et al. (2012) and Dawson and Seater (2013) apply methods like page-count
to directly quantify total regulations in the U.S. from either the Federal Register (FR) or
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). However, these measures exhibit only
longitudinal variation in total regulation.
In contrast to these, Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin (2015) use a rigorous text-

analysis approach to count for keywords like "shall," "must," "may not," "prohibited,"
and "required" --- that indicate binding constraints --- in the wordings of regulations in
the CFR. The CFR has a few advantages over the FR for such text-analysis approach.
The CFR contain only legally binding final rules whereas the FR may refer to more of

59

See, http://regdata.org/.

60

For cross-country analyses, extant studies use proxies like firm entry regulation index or economic freedom
indices like Freedom House, Heritage Foundation, etc. (for example, Djankov et al. 2002, Goel 2012).
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daily bureaucratic activity and also future plans of regulatory agencies that are not
binding. Such text-analysis approach using the CFR allows for the possibility of measuring
deregulation as well at various points reflected by a decrease in the usage of the keywords.
But a simple page-count is always a strictly non-negative number even though the content
of those pages might refer to deregulation. Moreover, as the authors state: A major
advantage of RegData is that it is "the first panel of federal regulation for the US...that
permits within industry and between-industry econometric analyses of the causes and
effects of federal regulations" (p. 2).
Nevertheless, the authors highlight that such text-analysis approach may be
open to same criticism as that of the page-count approach. To be precise, one page may
not be equivalent to another page to measure intensity of regulation. Likewise, the abovementioned keywords indicating binding constraints may manifest varied levels of
consequences. Regardless, text-analysis approach allows for "different levels of
granularity" when compared to page-count method (p. 4). Readers are referred to AlUbaydli and McLaughlin (2015) for further details on RegData.
To convert this national, industry-level data to state-level, I use historical
industrial composition of states following other literatures like Topalova (2010), Autor et
al. (2013), Lake and Millimet (2016). To be specific, I construct my state-level Regulation
variable by summing up the weighted industry-level RegData over industries
disaggregated at the four-digit code. The weights are given by the initial ratio of
employment in industry i to total employment in all industries in a state s. Initial ratio
refers to the weights being time-invariant over the sample period with 1990 as the base
period. Time-invariant weights essentially help to capture the impact of an increase in
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regulatory constraints itself instead of a change in the industrial composition of states
over time.
Formally, the Regulation variable (𝑅𝑠𝑡 ) is given by

𝑅𝑠𝑡 = ∑
𝑖=1

where

(𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑠,1990 )
(𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑠,1990 )

(𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑠,1990 )
∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑡
(𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑠,1990 )

(1)

is the time-invariant weight for each state and 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the national,

industry-level RegData. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑠,1990 represents the employment level in industry 𝑖 in state
𝑠 in the year 1990 that come from Quaterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW)
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Note, the RegData (𝑅𝑖𝑡 ) is published according to the
2007 NAICS code, whereas QCEW publishes the 1990 industrial employment data
according to the 2002 NAICS. To make things conformable, I map the industry-level
employment data to 2007 NAICS code by using the concordances for 2002 to 2007 NAICS
from the U.S. Census Bureau.61
For an overview, Figure 4 shows approximately an increasing trend in
federal regulations over these 24 years of the sample period. Figure 5 shows that on
average, Alaska ranks as the most regulated state whereas Nevada is the least. Figure 6,
when compared to Figure 3, indicate that few states like Montana, Louisiana, New

61

While mapping industries from 2002 NAICS to 2007 NAICS code, few industries undergo change in their
classification code. To overcome this issue, I assign weights to each four-digit level 2002 NAICS code to
capture what proportion of industries under 2002 NAICS correspond to 2007 NAICS code. For example, all
those 2002 codes that directly map one-to-one to 2007 codes, will have a weight of one. However, if two out
of 18 industries under a particular 2002 code get changed to a different code in 2007 NAICS, then these
two industries will have a weight of 0.111; the rest 16 industries will have a weight of 0.889. Once these
weights are assigned, I multiply these weights with the employment measure for each industry code. Finally,
I sum up these measures over 2007 NAICS codes to get industry-level employment measure classified
according to the NAICS 2007.
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Hampshire, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Minnesota, Wisconsin and
Oregon have high correlation between corruption and regulation within the time span
1990 - 2013.
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3.1.3

State Covariates
Following the works of Apergis et al. (2012) and Alt and Lassen (2014), I

control for various state-level characteristics that are found to influence corruption in the
U.S. These include economic factors like real per capita personal income to represent the
income status of a state, Gini coefficient to capture income inequality; demographic
features like education status given by percent of high school graduates and higher (among
population of 25 years age and above), unemployment level, size of the government given
by the real per capita government revenue, degree of urbanization denoted by share of
urban population in total population of the state; political indicators like a state’s citizen
ideology, government centralization given by share of state government’s expenditure in
total government expenditure, and divided government where a government is known to
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be divided if the legislature and executive branch are ruled by two different parties. All
the measures used to construct the above set of covariates are mentioned in Table A1.62

3.2

Empirical Strategy
To estimate the causal effect of government regulation on bureaucratic

corruption, I gradually build up my preferred model given by equation (12) below. To
proceed, in each sub-section below I discuss in detail a specific potential issue that may
bias the causal analysis and the corresponding solution I apply to circumvent it. Finally
in section 3.2.4, I put all the issues together to derive my preferred model. This process
enables a methodical inspection of all the complications associated and helps to
understand the preferred model.
3.2.1

Traditional Fixed Effects Model
I start off with a straightforward, one-way fixed effects model with a linear

time trend given by
𝐶𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑋𝑠𝑡 𝛽1 + 𝛾𝑅𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡 ,

(2)

where 𝐶𝑠𝑡 represents bureaucratic corruption in state 𝑠 in year 𝑡. 𝑋𝑠𝑡 is a vector of statelevel characteristics, and 𝛽₁ is a vector of conformable parameters. 𝑅𝑠𝑡 is government
regulation of industries. Thus, 𝛾 is the parameter of interest. 𝛼𝑠 is state fixed effect which
captures all time invariant unobserved heterogeneity that may affect corruption and may
be correlated with various economic and/or political characteristics of a state including
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Randomly missing variables for a year (e.g., government expenditure and government revenue) are
imputed by average of previous and following years. For variables like Urban Population and High school
graduates and higher (1990 - 2004), census counts are used. For non-censal years, linear interpolation
method is used. For High school graduates and higher for years 2005 - 2013, annual estimates from American
Community Survey are used. For population, census data are used as of the month, April. For non-censal
years, intercensal estimates as of the date July 1 are used.
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regulation, for example, unchanged factors within a state like political competition,
instability (see, Alt and Lassen 2014). t represents a linear time trend to capture
unobserved time effects that may impact all states equally (for example, some change in
federal laws concerning enforcement or prosecution of criminal cases) and 𝛿 is the
associated parameter. 𝜀𝑠𝑡 is mean zero idiosyncratic error term.
Even though I specify linear time trend (𝛿𝑡) for the remaining paper to
control for unobserved time effects, one can think of using a year-fixed effect instead, say
𝛿𝑡 . The transformed equation then represents a standard two-way error component model.
Results of both the specifications are considered, although it turns out that the time fixed
effects remove much of the variation in the data making the estimates very imprecise.
Equation (2) is estimated using the traditional FE estimator, and the
standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for serial correlation for a given
state. Results of this model are reported under column "Traditional FE" in the tables
below. However, several potential threats to identification of the causal effect exist in this
context. Traditional FE estimate is not likely to yield a consistent estimate of 𝛾 mainly
because the dependent variable suffers from one-sided measurement error and regulation
is not likely to be strictly exogenous in such an analysis.
It is worth mentioning here that few researchers may consider this
straightforward FE model to be a reasonable improvement on the existing literature. This
is mainly due to the specific approach I follow to construct the state-level regulation
variable, 𝑅𝑠𝑡 using the federal regulatory laws from RegData. Plausibly, this methodology
makes the constructed regulation measure potentially more exogenous in equation (2)
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when compared to an application of direct state-specific regulatory laws instead (see
Bartik 1991, Blanchard and Katz 1992). The corresponding argument is that state-specific
corruption and other state-level unobserved factors are likely to be less influential on
national-level decisions about regulatory constraints.63 Thus, issues like reverse causality
and omitted variable bias are likely to be less of a concern in the current analysis. Even
though this argument sounds reasonable apparently, it is important to note that PIN
reports all public corruption cases in a given state that include federal-, state-, and locallevel public officials. Hence, a high-profile bureaucrat (like a senator) from a particular
state may clearly be entrusted with enough power to influence decisions at the federal
level but then get recorded as a convicted public official under the specific state that he
represents.
In short, it is possible that my constructed state-level regulation measure
serves as relatively more exogenous in the current analysis that may reduce concerns
related to reverse causality and omitted variable bias to some extent. Nevertheless, one
cannot completely rule out the associated problems. Moreover, measurement error in
regulation remains a major concern. Given this, it is essential to control for any possible
endogeneity in 𝑅𝑠𝑡 in equation (2) that may persist regardless of the data construction
procedure.
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It is often argued in the literature of labor economics that interacting local industry shares with federal
industry level measure controls for potential endogeneity --- that may arise due to reverse causality and/or
omitted variable bias --- in the state-level variable thus constructed. This is mainly because a federal level
measure is likely to be an exogenous factor to a particular state where the state-specific characteristics are
less likely to affect national level policies and outcomes (see Bartik 1991, Blanchard and Katz 1992).
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3.2.2

Model with One-Sided Measurement Error in Bureaucratic Corruption
Here, I focus exclusively on the measurement error issue in the dependent

variable. It is well understood that because of the illicit nature, ‘true’' corruption level is
very hard to observe. Observed corruption, 𝐶𝑠𝑡 , is actually given by
∗
𝐶𝑠𝑡 = 𝐶𝑠𝑡
− 𝑢𝑠𝑡

(3)

∗
where 𝐶𝑠𝑡
is the ‘true’' (unobserved) latent measure of corruption and 𝑢𝑠𝑡 is the

measurement error. But, 𝑢𝑠𝑡 per se is not problematic in an analysis under the ‘classical’'
assumption. To be specific, measurement error in a continuous dependent variable does
not yield biased or inconsistent estimates - besides some loss of precision - provided this
measurement error is classical in nature. Classical error in a dependent variable implies a
mean zero error term that is uncorrelated with the covariates and has a constant variance.
However, given the specific data that is used here for corruption, it is reasonable to believe
that 𝑢𝑠𝑡 may in fact be ‘non-classical.’'
Public officials are convicted of a corrupt activity only when the crime is
reported to begin with, and then, if this is followed by ‘successful’' prosecution based on
evidence available. In the U.S., corruption related cases first go through criminal
investigations. Based on the outcome, it may or may not get referred to the Attorney’s
office. Once at the Attorney’s office, it is decided whether to prosecute a case or decline.
This decision is also contingent on the availability of resources to address corruption
related cases versus other crimes (see, for e.g., Alt and Lassen 2014 for a detailed
discussion on this).64 Theories in criminology often argue that "white-collar crimes,

64

Besides corruption convictions, U.S. Attorneys also handle cases related to drugs and immigration (Alt
and Lassen 2014).
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including corruption, are insufficiently prosecuted" (Alt and Lassen 2014, p. 307). Given
these, corruption is essentially under-reported. Thus, observed 𝐶𝑠𝑡 in this case is specifically
defined as
∗
𝐶𝑠𝑡 = 𝐶𝑠𝑡
− 𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢𝑠𝑡 ≥ 0

(4)

I explicitly model this one-sided measurement error 𝑢𝑠𝑡 by treating the outcome in
∗
equation (2) now as 𝐶𝑠𝑡
and then substituting equation (4) in equation (2). This,

therefore, gives me the following structural equation
𝐶𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽₀ + 𝑋𝑠𝑡 𝛽₁ + 𝛾𝑅𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡 − 𝑢𝑠𝑡

(5)

where
𝜀𝑠𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀2 )
𝑢𝑠𝑡 ∼ 𝑁⁺(0, 𝜎𝑢2 (ℎ𝑠𝑡 )).
𝜀𝑠𝑡 is assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation, 𝜎𝜀 .
Thus, 𝜀𝑠𝑡 is the standard two-sided idiosyncratic error term of the model. 𝑢𝑠𝑡 is a onesided strictly nonnegative unobserved factor that affects the observed dependent variable
(𝐶𝑠𝑡 ) and has a positive mean. I assume 𝑢𝑠𝑡 to follow a half-normal distribution that has
2

2

a mean of √𝜋 𝜎𝑢 and a variance of (1 − 𝜋)𝜎𝑢2. Potential heteroskedasticity of 𝑢𝑠𝑡 is
accommodated by re-writing 𝜎𝑢2 as 𝜎𝑢2 (ℎ𝑠𝑡 ) where ℎ𝑠𝑡 ⊆ 𝑋𝑠𝑡 . 𝜀𝑠𝑡 and 𝑢𝑠𝑡 are independent of
each other. Plausible intuition behind such assumptions is discussed shortly.
At this point, it is worth noting that the above model resembles a normalhalf normal stochastic frontier (SF) model within a panel data framework (see, e.g.,
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Greene 2005 for details).65 Thus, equation (5) can be estimated in the current context via
a SF approach.66 Having said that, a particular characteristic of a SF model needs a special
emphasis here. As Kumbhakar et al. (2014) point out: ignoring heteroskedasticity of the
two-sided idiosyncratic error leads to (downward) biased estimate of the intercept;
estimates

of

coefficient

parameters

are

still

consistent.

However,

ignoring

heteroskedasticity of the one-sided error term leads to biased estimates of the parameters.
Hence, modeling heteroskedasticity of 𝑢𝑠𝑡 is of fundamental importance to obtain a
consistent estimate of 𝛾. Also, correct specification of the form of the heteroskedasticity
function is equally essential (Millimet 2017). In absence of such careful considerations,
estimation of equation (5) yields biased and inconsistent estimates. But, this includes a
caveat. Any assumption about the heteroskedasticity of 𝑢𝑠𝑡 is not directly testable. One
can only evaluate the significance of the coefficient estimates once the estimation is carried
out.
Now, to fix ideas in the current context, consider 𝑢𝑠𝑡 , for e.g., to be the
unobserved prosecutorial resources, as discussed before, that are allocated to address
corruption specific cases. According to the "system capacity theory" (e.g., Pontell 1984),
an increase in enforcement effort, specifically prosecutorial resources, increase the number
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Greene (2005) was the first to explicitly model the time-invariant fixed effects (in the usual panel-datasense) in a normal-half normal SF model. Earlier papers considered the fixed effect, 𝛼𝑠 , to be a part of the
unobserved inefficiency term which was also assumed to be time invariant. Due to this, the distributional
assumption that was imposed on the inefficiency term, got imposed on the time-invariant fixed effects as
well. Greene (2005) disentangled the usual-panel-sense fixed effect from the unobserved inefficiency term,
thereby making the former distribution free. He further allowed the inefficiency term to be ‘time-varying’'
as well, i.e., 𝑢𝑠𝑡 , if necessary.
As a cursory review: 𝑢𝑠𝑡 in a SF model is termed as the unobserved ‘inefficiency’' of a firm that enters a
production function (cost function) with a negative (positive) sign; estimation is via maximum likelihood
with some distributional assumption imposed upon 𝑢𝑠𝑡 ; heteroskedasticity in both 𝜀𝑠𝑡 and 𝑢𝑠𝑡 are allowed.
Estimation of equation (5) is carried out by the -sfpanel- command in Stata (see, Belotti et al. 2013).
66
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of prosecutions and ultimately, the number of convictions. Thus, an increase in 𝑢𝑠𝑡 leads
to an increase in 𝐶𝑠𝑡 .67 Contrasting to this, the "deterrence theory" (Becker and Stigler
1974) suggests that more prosecutorial resources will eventually see cutbacks in corrupt
practices by public officials because of higher risk of successful prosecution. Hence, an
∗
increase in 𝑢𝑠𝑡 leads to a fall in ‘true’' corruption, 𝐶𝑠𝑡
. Thus, higher 𝑢𝑠𝑡 reduces the gap
∗
between 𝐶𝑠𝑡 and 𝐶𝑠𝑡
. In this sense, allocation of prosecutorial resources (𝑢𝑠𝑡 ) is conceivable

to be an unobserved factor that determines the deviation of the observed 𝐶𝑠𝑡 from the
∗
‘true’' unobserved 𝐶𝑠𝑡
. Also, allocation of prosecutorial resources to corruption specific

cases is expected to be non-negative with its mean to be a positive number. Further, an
implication of a half-normal distribution --- as opposed to truncated-normal distribution
--- is to have a modal value of zero (see, e.g. Millimet 2017). One can refer this as the
possibility of corruption related cases being rarely prosecuted (as mentioned earlier) since
"local prosecutors see the level of resources available to them as the primary obstacle for
prosecuting white collar crime" (Alt and Lassen 2014, p. 310).
To consider potential heteroskedasticity of 𝑢𝑠𝑡 , the key lies in knowing what
determines the allocation of resources to combat corruption in the U.S. Such decisions in
the U.S. rest with the Attorneys who are appointees of the President. But, such
appointment decisions are believed to be influenced by partisan factors (Eisenstein 1978).
Hence, decisions on resource allocation are suspected to reflect such partisan influences
(e.g., Whitford 2002, Gordon 2009, Beale 2009). In this context, Alt and Lassen (2014, p.
313, 317, 312) state: "If the appointment process is politicized in this way, fewer resources
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Alt and Lassen (2014) find empirical support for increase in convictions due to increase in prosecutorial
resources, other things equal.
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would be allocated to districts in which co-partisans of the President were in power, in
order to skew the distribution of prosecutions and convictions away from one’s allies and
toward one's opponents." In their study, the authors account for this (potential)
partisanship by considering the "congruence" between the President's ideology and that
of the population of a state. They find empirical support for changes in prosecutorial
efforts due to changes in partisanship across different administrations. The authors further
note that such partisanship, leading to an increase in federal enforcement, is possibly more
pronounced in urban areas.
Given this background, it is reasonable to conjecture that the variance of
𝑢𝑠𝑡 is determined by various political factors. I therefore condition 𝜎𝑢2 on the political
indicators, denoted by ℎ𝑠𝑡 above, from the set of covariates used here for analysis (𝑋𝑠𝑡 ).
Specifically, variables like divided government, citizen's ideology, governmental
centralization, and also urbanization are utilized to model the heteroskedasticity of 𝑢𝑠𝑡 .
As Millimet (2017, p. 5) demonstrates that an over-specified heteroskedasticity function
"yield superior estimates in terms of bias," higher order terms of these four variables are
included in the heteroskedasticity design, that is, linear, quadratic and interaction terms
among all the four variables. Results of this model are reported under column "FE-SFM"
in the tables below.
3.2.3

Model with Potential Endogeneity of Regulation
Here, I consider specifically the issues related to the regulation variable, 𝑅𝑠𝑡 ,

and ignore the problem associated with bureaucratic corruption. As said, regulation in
such an analysis is not likely to be strictly exogenous. The pertinent reasons are as follows.
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First, reverse causality. A substantial amount of extant literature is
supportive of the idea that corruption leads to more regulation to benefit the elite (e.g.,
Banerjee 1997, Bartels 2008, Breen and Gillanders 2012, Stiglitz 2012, Stockman 2013).
Referring to this, Holcombe and Boudreaux (2015, p. 82) state: "There are good
theoretical reasons to believe that the empirical relationships between ... regulation and
corruption, are bicausal." The regulatory capture theory (Stigler 1971) argues that a
corrupt political system is likely to increase the demand for regulation. Industries would
advocate for more regulation because it increases barriers to entry. This in turn increases
the market power of the existing industries by keeping potential competitors out of the
market. Thus, industries tend to influence regulators by offering bribes to implement
regulation that are favorable to them. Thus, "corruption is potentially a cause and effect"
of regulation (Breen and Gillanders 2012, p. 268).68
Second, omitted variable bias. Unobserved determinants of political
corruption, for example, institutional quality, business environment, organizational
culture reflecting the level of trust and honesty, existence of informal institutions, quality
of politicians, de-facto decentralization of government, lobbying expenditures, etc. may be
correlated with regulation (e.g., Pieroni and d'Agostino 2013). Beside these two, the third
issue of potential measurement error in regulation is a major concern. Johnson et al. (1998,
p. 387) state, "[W]hile formal rules may count in some instances, what really matters is
how regulations and tax rules are actually implemented." As researchers, what we observe
as regulation is only the ‘formal’' regulation proposed by a government of a country. But,
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The authors find empirical evidence in favor of corruption being one of the key determinants of poor
regulation in a cross-country analysis.
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what gets implemented in practice may be reasonably different from this formal definition.
It is necessary to take into account the "application" process of regulation, as opposed to
just focussing on "total burden" (Lambsdorff 2005, p. 17). One plausible factor that may
distinguish between de-jure and de-facto regulatory experience is the "discretionary
power" of bureaucrats who are responsible for such implementations (Duvanova 2014, p.
298). Formally, one can write 𝑅𝑠𝑡 in the initial model given by equation (2) as
∗
𝑅𝑠𝑡 = 𝑅𝑠𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑠𝑡

(6)

∗
where 𝑅𝑠𝑡 is observed de-jure regulation, 𝑅𝑠𝑡
is unobserved de-facto regulatory practice

and 𝜇𝑠𝑡 is the measurement error.69 Also, use of various proxies for the quantity of
government regulation exacerbate the problem (see Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin 2015 for
further references).
Thus, 𝑅𝑠𝑡 is potentially correlated with the error term, 𝜀𝑠𝑡 in the equation
(2), thereby making regulation potentially endogenous in nature. Formally, the first-stage
equation is given by
𝑅𝑠𝑡 = 𝜋₀ + 𝑋𝑠𝑡 𝜋₁ + 𝜋𝑠 + 𝛿₁𝑡 + 𝜂𝑠𝑡

(7)

where 𝜋𝑠 is the state-fixed effect, 𝜋₁ (a vector) and 𝛿₁ are conformable parameters, and
𝜂𝑠𝑡 is mean zero error term that is correlated with 𝜀𝑠𝑡 in (2).70 Recall, 𝜀𝑠𝑡 is defined
69

Note, while considering such potential measurement error in regulation, I assume that the ‘true’' model
∗
for estimating the causal effect of regulation on corruption is given by 𝐶𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽₀ + 𝑋𝑠𝑡 𝛽₁ + 𝛾𝑅𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡 +
∗
𝜀̃𝑠𝑡 where 𝑅𝑠𝑡 is an unobserved, latent measure of regulation and 𝜀𝑠𝑡 = 𝜀̃𝑠𝑡 − 𝛾𝜇𝑠𝑡 . Thus, 𝑅𝑠𝑡 is correlated
with the error term 𝜀𝑠𝑡 in equation (2).
70

Given the ‘true’' model defined above, the ‘true’' first-stage equation is given by
∗
𝑅𝑠𝑡
=π₀+𝑋𝑠𝑡 π₁+𝜋𝑠₁ +λ₁t+𝜂̃𝑠𝑡 where 𝜂𝑠𝑡 =𝜂̃𝑠𝑡 +𝜇𝑠𝑡 . Thus, the first-stage error (𝜂𝑠𝑡 ) and the second-stage error
(𝜀𝑠𝑡 ) is correlated due to the measurement error (𝜇𝑠𝑡 ) in regulation, even in absence of omitted variable bias
and/or reverse causality issues.
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previously as the mean zero idiosyncratic error term. Because of various complexities
associated with empirical studies on corruption and regulation, finding a credible,
traditional instrumental variable for regulation is difficult. To comprehend an exogenous
factor that affects political corruption only through the channel of regulatory policies, is
hard. Thus, traditional exclusion restrictions are absent to identify the model.
To circumvent the need for traditional instruments, I apply the
identification strategy of Lewbel (2012). The Lewbel (2012) strategy exploits the
conditional second moments of data to generate valid instruments within the model itself
when standard exclusion restrictions are absent. Specifically, the Lewbel (2012) approach
shows that if the first-stage error (𝜂𝑠𝑡 ) is heteroskedastic, and at least some of the
covariates (𝑋𝑠𝑡 ) are correlated with variance of the first-stage error (𝜂𝑠𝑡 ), but uncorrelated
with the product of the first- and second-stage (𝜀𝑠𝑡 ) errors, then the model is identified.
Formally, if there exists 𝑧 ⊆ 𝑋, where 𝑋 ∈ {𝑋𝑠𝑡 }, such that
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑧, 𝜂²) ≠ 0

(8)

𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑧, 𝜀𝜂) = 0,

(9)

then 𝑧̃ ≡ (𝑧 − 𝑧̅)𝜂 are valid instruments. Note that the first condition given by (8), is
directly tested by applying the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (Koenker 1981
version). I choose those covariates as 𝑧 variables which are related to the first-stage error
variance.71 I then use the estimated residual, 𝜂𝑠𝑡 from the first-stage, equation (7), and
demeaned 𝑧 variables to construct valid instruments 𝑧̃ ≡ (𝑧 − 𝑧̅)𝜂. Using these generated

Lewbel (2012, p. 71) mentions that if 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑧, 𝜂²) is close or equal to zero, then there will be weak
instruments issue which will yield imprecise estimates with large standard errors. I will discuss such
possibilities in the results section.
71
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instruments, the structural equation is initially estimated via Limited Information
Maximum Likelihood (LIML) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for
comparison. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the state level.72
The second Lewbel condition, given by equation (9), implies that the
generated instruments 𝑧̃ are valid instruments for 𝑅𝑠𝑡 . 𝑧̃ is given by (𝑧 − 𝑧̅)𝜂 which implies
that the instruments are uncorrelated with 𝜀. However, the strength of the instruments is
proportional to the covariance between 𝑧 and 𝜂, and this in turn depends on the degree
of heteroskedasticity of 𝜂 with respect to 𝑧 (Lewbel 2012, p. 70). To check the validity of
my generated instruments, I report the standard IV (instrumental variable) specification
tests (underidentification, overidentification, Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic, and test for
endogeneity of regulation)73 along with the coefficient estimates. Results of this model are
reported under column "FE-IV" in the tables below.
Next, I turn to provide some plausible intuition behind the Lewbel (2012)
identification strategy particularly applicable in the current context. Following
Choudhury (2015), I define the error terms, 𝜀 and 𝜂, as:
𝜀𝑠𝑡 ≡ 𝜎𝜀 𝜆𝑠𝑡

(10)

𝜂𝑠𝑡 ≡ 𝜎𝜂 (𝑧)𝜆𝑠𝑡 ,

(11)

where,
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Estimation is conducted using the -xtivreg2- command in Stata.

73

Under-identification test reports the p-value of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk statistic with rejection
implying identification; Over-identification reports the p-value of Hansen J statistic with rejection casting
doubt on instruments' validity; F-statistic reports the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for weak identification;
Endogeneity test reports the p-value of endogeneity test of the endogenous regressors.
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𝜀𝑠𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀2 )
𝜂𝑠𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜂2 (𝑧))
𝜆𝑠𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0,1).
Given the above structure of the error terms, the Lewbel (2012) conditions, given by
equations (8) and (9), are satisfied. Note, 𝜆𝑠𝑡 is a mean zero common homoskedastic factor
- that influences both regulation and corruption - which must be independent of the
standard deviations, 𝜎𝜀 and 𝜎𝜂 (𝑧), and also of 𝑧 variables. Heteroskedasticity in 𝜂𝑠𝑡 is
accommodated by its standard deviation, 𝜎𝜂 (𝑧), being dependent on 𝑧 variables. So, what
may define 𝜆𝑠𝑡 and relevant 𝑧 variables in the current application such that the above
error structures are reasonable to hold - intuitively? Recall the earlier discussion on
discretionary powers of bureaucrats. Duvanova (2014, p. 298) defines "discretionary
power" as "the ability of local or street-level bureaucrats to freely interpret regulatory
norms in the process of their implementation..." In that sense, I define 𝜆𝑠𝑡 to be the
unobserved discretionary powers of public officials that affect regulation implementation.
𝜆𝑠𝑡 ≥ 0 is assumed when the discretionary power is used by bureaucrats in a positive way,
i.e., to facilitate the process of actual implementation of laws. Several researchers conclude
that such bureaucratic discretion is a necessity for institutional evolution and positive
economic outcomes (see, for e.g., Lipsky 1980, Piore 2011). Whereas, 𝜆𝑠𝑡 ≤ 0 represents
the condition when this power is abused, leading to inaccuracies and lack of commitment
to organizational goals (see, for e.g., Klitgaard et al. 2000, Duvanova 2014). While
administrative discretion is not legally binding (permissive but not mandatory, and not
obligated to be exercised in a particular way), failure to exercise reasonable judgement is
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interpreted as abuse of discretion.74 Given these, assumptions of 𝜆𝑠𝑡 to be mean zero and
independent of state-specific characteristics seem reasonable.
𝜆𝑠𝑡 also affects corruption outcome as this power may facilitate the ‘abuse
of public office for private gain’' (see for e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1986, Dal Bo et al. 2006,
Apergis et al. 2012).75 However, the final impact of officials' discretionary power on
regulation implementation depends on some state-level attributes, defined by 𝑧. The effect
is either enhanced or diminished by such state-specific characteristics as captured by
𝜎𝜂 (𝑧). In my analysis, the state-specific characteristics that statistically generate valid
instruments for regulation are income inequality, education level, government
centralization and divided government. Now I move on to examine why these state-specific
economic and political conditions may enhance or diminish the impact of bureaucrats’'
discretionary power on regulation.
Consider two states with bureaucrats having the same level of 𝜆𝑠𝑡 . First, if
one state is more polarized in its income status (or, in distribution of resources generally),
it is more likely that the wealthy group of this state which include industrialists is
relatively more influential. Lobbying for rules and regulations that will eventually be
favorable to them becomes relatively easier when the gap is larger. Few studies suggest a
positive association between income inequality and regulation (Carter 2006, McLaughlin
and Stanley 2016). Thus, the impact of a bureaucrat’s discretion (𝜆𝑠𝑡 ) on regulatory
practices (𝜂𝑠𝑡 ) may be magnified in a state with higher income inequality, captured by
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See, "Administrative Discretion." West's Encyclopedia of American Law. Encyclopedia.com.
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This is the most common definition of corruption in extant literature (e.g., Goel and Nelson 1998).
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𝜎𝜂 (𝑧). Second, a more educated state implies more informed and aware inhabitants.
Deceiving or misleading business people (intentionally or unintentionally) is expected to
be harder in this case while a bureaucrat interprets and implements regulatory laws. The
role of press in all probability is also more pronounced here. Any sort of lobbying by the
business group is likely to be more challenging under persistent supervision of (unbiased)
media. Hence, the impact of 𝜆𝑠𝑡 is likely to be lessened on 𝜂𝑠𝑡 when a bureaucrat functions
in a state with a higher education level. Third, if a state government is more centralized
in its administrative and/or fiscal policies and functionalities, lesser power is delegated to
the local level public officials. Under such an instance, the scope of influencing the
execution of a policy gets restricted. Conversely, this may imply that the state-level
bureaucrats are more likely to be responsible for such implementations. In this context,
Goel and Nelson (2011, p. 475) state: "Smaller jurisdictions could also engender ... more
regulations with more jurisdictions or ‘tollbooths’." Therefore, variation in the impact of
𝜆𝑠𝑡 on regulatory practices ((𝜂𝑠𝑡 ) is plausible, contingent on how centralized the state
government is, captured by 𝜎𝜂 (𝑧). Finally, when governance is split between two
(opposing) political parties, bureaucrats at all levels and capacities are obligated to be
more vigilant towards their actions and responsibilities. They are under greater scrutiny
- not only more frequently, but probably even for the minutest reason possible - due to
the differences in political ideologies between the ruling parties. Under divided
government, there is a "more constrained bureaucracy, with less flexibility to respond to
changing circumstances, and in greater conflict with its political supervisors" (Epstein
and O'Halloran 1996, p. 395). Thus, the impact of 𝜆𝑠𝑡 on 𝜂𝑠𝑡 is likely to be constricted in
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this environment, as opposed to a state where there is some consensus in political ideas
and practices.
3.2.4

Comprehensive Model
Now, I put together all the issues discussed above to obtain my preferred

model given by
𝐶𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽₀ + 𝑋𝑠𝑡 𝛽₁ + 𝛾𝑅𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑣𝑠𝑡

(12)

where
𝑣𝑠𝑡 = 𝜀𝑠𝑡 − 𝑢𝑠𝑡
𝜀𝑠𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀² )
𝑢𝑠𝑡 ∼ 𝑁⁺(0, 𝜎𝑢² (ℎ𝑠𝑡 ))
and 𝑅𝑠𝑡 is endogenous in nature as it is correlated with the error term 𝑣𝑠𝑡 . Note, the firststage equation of the analysis is still given by the equation (7). So, the first-stage error
𝜂𝑠𝑡 is correlated with the composite second-stage error (𝑣𝑠𝑡 ) via 𝜀𝑠𝑡 . Given this model,
the first Lewbel (2012) condition, equation (8), still holds true and so also the first-stage
statistics like Underidentification test and Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for the generated
instrumental variables. However, the second Lewbel (2012) condition, given by equation
(9), is re-written as
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑧, 𝑣𝜂) = 0

(13)

which implies that the 𝑧 variables must not be correlated with the product of the firststage error (𝜂𝑠𝑡 ) and the second stage composite error, 𝑣𝑠𝑡 . This condition is also satisfied
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by my model specification and related assumptions and the pertinent intuitions explained
thus far remain unaltered.76
To sum up, I apply the Lewbel (2012) identification strategy --- to account
for potential endogeneity of regulation in absence of traditional instruments via a control
function approach --- while explicitly modeling the one-sided measurement error of the
dependent variable. Formally, the augmented structural equation that is finally estimated
is given by
𝐶𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑋𝑠𝑡 𝛽1 + 𝛾𝑅𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝜂̂ 𝑠𝑡 + 𝜉𝑠𝑡 − 𝑢𝑠𝑡 ,

(14)

where 𝜉𝑠𝑡 is now a well behaved two-sided idiosyncratic error term, 𝑢𝑠𝑡 is the one-sided
measurement error and 𝜂𝑠𝑡 is the first-stage residual. Estimation is conducted via a SF
approach to obtain a consistent estimate of 𝛾, the parameter of interest. Bootstrap
standard errors clustered at the state-level are reported.77 Results of this comprehensive
model are reported under column "FE-SFM-IV" in the tables below.
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Here, one may question the validity of the generated instruments when the one-sided measurement error
is modeled explicitly since the test of over-identifying restrictions cannot be performed any further with SF
estimation strategy. However, as Murray (2006, p. 117) points out: "Some economists are very wary of overidentification tests, because they rest on there being enough valid instruments to over-identify the
relationship. Their worry is that too often, a failure to reject the null hypothesis of valid over-identifying
restrictions tempts us to think we have verified the validity of all of the instruments. Economists should
resist that temptation." In other words, a rejection of the over-identification test might be worrisome as it
implies that too few instruments are valid to identify the equation. But, merely a failure to reject the test
only implies that enough instruments are valid for identification; it does not verify the validity of all the
instruments. Hence, given that my generated instruments pass the overidentification test in the standard
LIML estimation strategy, I interpret my instruments to be just reasonable enough to identify the model,
even after modeling the one-sided measurement error.
77

Bootstrap standard errors are reported with 500 repetitions.
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4

4.1

Results

Baseline
The baseline results are presented in Table 2. At the risk of sounding

repetitive, the results of the straightforward FE model are reported under column labeled
Traditional FE. Results pertaining to the model that controls only for one-sided
measurement error in bureaucratic corruption are presented under column FE-SFM. The
model that controls for potential endogeneity of regulation alone has the results reported
under column FE-IV. Finally, results of the comprehensive model that controls for both
the econometric issues are presented under column FE-SFM-IV. Thus, the column FESFM-IV represents the preferred estimate.
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The Traditional FE estimate indicates a zero effect both in terms of
magnitude and statistical significance. But, the sign reveals a positive association between
regulation and corruption. The estimate implies that for one standard deviation increase
in regulation, bureaucratic corruption in the U.S. (number of convictions per 1000
government employees) is expected to increase by 0.9% only, although statistically
insignificant. In contrast, the FE-SFM estimate indicates that a one standard deviation
increase in regulatory constraints causes more than 2% increase in bureaucratic
corruption. And, the impact is statistically significant at the 𝑝 < 0.10 confidence level.
When considering the FE-IV results, the first important finding is the
evidence in favor of the identification strategy in the current context. The generated
Lewbel (2012) instruments pass the standard IV specification tests reasonably. To be
specific, the underidentification test rejects the null hypothesis that the model is underidentified at the 𝑝 < 0.05 confidence level using the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk LM
statistic. The test of overidentification fails to reject the null of instruments being invalid
at the 𝑝 < 0.10 confidence level using the Hansen J-statistic. In addition, the KleibergenPaap F-statistic performs well as it is higher than the standard threshold value of 10.
This validates the explanatory power of my generated instruments within the model.
Given this, we reject the null of strict exogeneity of government regulation at the 𝑝 <
0.10 confidence level, as reported by the Endogeneity test. The FE-IV estimate is
statistically significant at the 𝑝 < 0.01 confidence level, both by the traditional approach
and by the Anderson-Rubin (1949) weak instrument robust test. Further, the magnitude
of the apparent ‘causal impact’' is as large as an 8% decrease in bureaucratic corruption
due to a one standard deviation increase in government regulation.
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As opposed to the above set of naive estimates, the preferred FE-SFM-IV
estimate reveals no causal link between government regulation and corruption. The
coefficient is −0.011, and although not presented here in the interest of brevity, the 95%
confidence interval (CI) is given by [−0.078 0.055].78 Thus, the effect is economically and
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Given the prevailing belief about the potential
association between government regulation and bureaucratic corruption, this revelation
of an absence of a causal link is consequential. This also counters the earlier evidence of
a statistically significant and positive impact of regulation (or, absence of economic
freedom to be precise) on corruption across U.S. states (Apergis et al. 2012). My findings,
therefore, substantiate the risk involved in inferring anything about the causal relationship
from extant empirical evidence.
In short, the FE-SFM results, relative to the Traditional FE model, suggest
that failure to address one-sided measurement error in corruption measure leads to a
downward bias in the effect of regulation on bureaucratic corruption. The FE-IV results,
relative to Traditional FE, suggest that failure to address endogeneity of regulation leads
to an upward bias in the impact. But then, on addressing both these issues in my preferred
model, I find a result that is close to the original Traditional FE but negative and
insignificant instead of positive and insignificant.
On trying to interpret what the preferred estimate reveals in the current
context, the first thing to note is the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is not
‘overwhelmingly’' high in the current analysis and the sample size is moderate with a
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The bootstrapped 95% CIs for FE-SFM-IV estimates are available upon request.
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total 1194 observations. Hence, the width of the CI is moderately wide. The top 95% CI
indicates that a one standard deviation increase in regulation can increase bureaucratic
corruption maximum by 6.3%. One can interpret this result in the following way also.
When a state moves from the 25th percentile (3.04) to the 75th percentile (4.34) of
regulation, then the state experiences an increase in regulatory constraints by almost one
standard deviation. This consequently leads to an increase in bureaucratic corruption by
almost one standard deviation as well. On the other hand, the lower 95% CI reveals that
bureaucratic corruption can decrease by atmost 9% due to an increase in regulatory
constraint by one standard deviation. Hence, one cannot rule out moderately large positive
or large negative effects when considering the width of the confidence interval. Yet, the
coefficient −0.011 represents the best point estimate to understand the association
between regulation and corruption. In other words, though it is difficult to infer a
definitive answer about the ‘true’ value' of the parameter of interest --- as opposed to
what one would prefer ideally --- the above coefficient is, nevertheless, the best point
estimate available. This indicates a decrease in bureaucratic corruption by 1.3% due to a
one standard deviation increase in regulation.
If one accepts this negative effect despite the imprecision, it is noteworthy
that this deterrence effect on corrupt practices due to greater regulation is in consonance
with the findings of Graeff and Mehlkop (2003), Berg et al. (2012) and Pieroni and
d’Agostino (2013). As mentioned in section 2.1.2, Graeff and Mehlkop (2003, p. 615) find
in their cross-national study that some regulatory constraints may lead to lesser
corruption, particularly in rich countries, by increasing the costs of illegitimate bargains.
The authors state that "when lack of economic freedom increases the transaction costs of
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illegal bargains, corruption could become less likely. Unfortunately, increasing the
transaction costs for illegal actors is usually an obstacle for legal actors as well." Besides
this, my finding also conforms with the theoretical prediction of a socially superior
outcome --- in terms of a reduction in corruption --- due to intense competition in the
market that may result from an increase in regulatory constraints (Djankov et al. 2002,
Lambsdorff 2005).
Next, I discuss the results pertaining to modeling heteroskedasticity of the
one-sided measurement error in bureaucratic corruption. As explained in section 3.2.2, it
is not only essential to model heteroskedasticity to get unbiased and consistent estimates,
incorporating an over-specified heteroskedasticity function is advisable than an underspecified function in order to yield superior estimates, as demonstrated by Millimet (2017).
These are presented in Tables 3 and 4 for the FE-SFM and FE-SFM-IV models,
respectively. Column (1) has only linear terms of the variables, Column (2) consists of
both linear and quadratic terms, Column (3) includes linear, quadratic and interaction
terms

among

the

continuous

variables

(i.e.,

citizen’s

ideology,

governmental

centralization, and urbanization), and finally Column (4) consist of the full specification
with linear, quadratic and interaction terms among all the four variables.
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Considering Table 3 first, it is interesting to note that as one includes higher
order terms in the heteroskedasticity function, the impact becomes statistically significant
at least at the 𝑝 < 0.10 confidence level, even though the magnitude remains almost the
same. This is further validated by the statistical significance of the coefficient estimates
for most of the terms included, as revealed in column (4). Out of these, divided
government and centralization seem to be the most important state-specific characteristics
to model the heteroskedasticity function. These results provide evidence in favor of my
assumptions made about the one-sided measurement error in bureaucratic corruption
(refer to section 3.2.2). Further, these evidence are qualitatively robust in the
comprehensive model where endogeneity of regulation is also controlled for (Table 4).
When moving from column (1) to column (4), the magnitude of the impact falls by almost
3%. Though statistically the impact is never significant, economically, a change in the
magnitude of the impact by 3% is considerably significant in this case because the outcome
in the current context refers to a criminal activity.
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To sum up, Table 2 provides evidence in favor of regulation being
endogenous in nature and no causal effect of regulatory constraints on bureaucratic
corruption in the U.S. It also reveals the importance of taking into account the
econometric issues like endogeneity and non-classical measurement error while analysing
a causal effect. Lastly, Tables 3 and 4 present favorable evidence for the assumptions
made in the current context about the one-sided measurement error in bureaucratic
corruption. It also manifests the significance of accounting for higher degrees of
heteroskedasticity in this error term.79

4.2

Robustness Checks
I conduct a few robustness checks, the results of which are mainly presented

in Tables 5 and 6. To begin with, the FE-IV model where only potential endogeneity of
regulation is controlled for by applying the Lewbel (2012) identification strategy,
estimation conducted via LIML is also presented for comparative analysis with GMM.
Performance of LIML estimates are arguably more reliable in case of weak instruments
(Stock et al. 2002). Although my generated Lewbel (2012) instruments perform reasonably
well in the current context, nevertheless, examining the performance via LIML estimation
further strengthens the evidence in favor of the main findings.
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All these results are based on the model that uses a linear time trend to control for unobserved time
effects, as given by equation (12). The entire set of analysis is repeated by using a time fixed effect instead.
The results are presented in Tables A2, A3 and A4 in the appendix.
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As seen in Table 5, the impact of government regulation on bureaucratic
corruption is found to be statistically significant by the Anderson-Rubin (1949) weak
instrument robust test at the 𝑝 < 0.01 confidence level. This is completely consistent
with the results reported by estimation via GMM. Also, the magnitude of the impact
remains almost the same. Besides this, it is worth mentioning here that I repeated my
analysis using traditional instrumental variable for regulation following Goel (2012). The
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author uses population measure and economic freedom as instruments for his regulation
proxy (refer to section 2.1.2). Though not shown here, the results indicate weak
instruments problem as the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic was considerably lower
than the standard threshold. Given the poor performance of these instruments, it is hard
to infer anything about the impact since the estimates are imprecise.
Next, recall that I use convictions of public officials of the year (𝑡 + 1) as a
proxy for corruption in the year 𝑡 to circumvent the timing-issue associated with the
conviction data. This is mainly because convictions usually take place at a much later
date than the time of occurrence of the crime, as explained in section 3.1. I repeat the
analysis for the FE-IV and FE-SFM-IV models by using convictions of (𝑡 + 𝑟) year for
current corruption where 𝑟 ≥ 2. Results of this are presented in Table 6 where 𝑟 =
2, 3, 4 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5. As shown, my main findings are robust to this check. For FE-IV model, the
impact is consistently found to be significant in statistical sense. The Anderson-Rubin
(1949) weak instrument robust test reveals government regulation to ‘cause’' lesser
corruption at the 𝑝 < 0.05 confidence level for 𝑟 = 2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 3, and greater corruption at the
𝑝 < 0.10 confidence level once the window width is expanded further. In terms of
economic significance, the impact is reasonable initially. But eventually it becomes almost
zero as the timing effect dies out. This implies that it is highly unlikely that conviction of
a present-day crime will actually take place three years later. If one conducts the causal
analysis by ignoring the measurement error issue in corruption, then one may end up
erroneously interpreting this result as an evidence in favor of the general consensus about
the efficiency and expeditious nature of a judicial system in a developed country where
institutions are sound.
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However, if one investigates the causal impact carefully by accounting for
both the measurement error problem in corruption and potential endogenous nature of
regulation, then the FE-SFM-IV estimates consistently reveal a zero effect, both in terms
of magnitude and statistical significance. Thus, my robustness checks present evidence in
favor of my main findings.
5

Conclusion
"[T]he link between regulation and corruption is still unexplored fully and

that more rigorous empirical tests are needed to establish causation," (Djankov 2009, p.
199). This holds true despite the persistent belief that more regulation spurs more
corruption (e.g., Bardhan 1997, Holcombe and Boudreaux 2015). In this respect, Shleifer
and Vishny (1993, p. 601) explain that "an important reason why many of these permits
and regulations exist is probably to give officials the power to deny them and to collect
bribes in return for providing the permit." Goel and Nelson (2010, p. 443) also claim that
"certain forms of government intervention in the economy, namely in the regulatory area,
do promote corruption by creating greater opportunities for bribe-taking and bribe-giving
behavior."
While the empirical literature on correlation between regulation and
corruption is contradictory and inconclusive, inferring any sort of causal relationship from
these evidence is precarious at best. Theoretical predictions also point to a bidirectional
causality (Pigou 1938, McChesney 1987, Shleifer and Vishny 1993, Stigler 1971). Given
this, I address the following question in this paper: Does government regulation have a

causal impact on bureaucratic corruption?
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From policy perspective, empirically evaluating the causal link is crucial. It
is plausible that greater corruption is an "inadvertent consequence of benevolent
regulation" (Djankov et al. 2002, p. 5). If intense regulatory practices give rise to greater
corruption as a ‘by-product,’' then this has important implications for how policies may
deal with corrupt practices. If regulation actually causes greater corruption, then a mere
deregulation is not an answer to fighting corruption. In this respect, Bardhan (1997, p.
1335) appropriately states: "The first point that is commonly made, no doubt with a great
deal of justification, is that regulations and bureaucratic allocation of scarce public
resources breed corruption, and so the immediate task is to get rid of them." But, one
must take into account that "[t]here are many regulations which serve some other valued
social objectives, and there may be a tradeoff between these objectives and that of
reducing corruption through deregulation." Policymakers are then warranted to come up
with an alternative tool to curb corruption while keeping regulation in its place to retain
its true objective.
To elaborate, Public Interest theory assumes that a benevolent government
imposes regulation in order to protect public from market failures and inefficiencies (Pigou
1938), that is, a welfare enhancing purpose like screening out low quality firms from
entering the market (Djankov et al. 2002). If a government designs regulation with such
a specific objective in mind but regulation is eventually found to cause more corruption,
then in such an instance there is a cost to deregulation. Instead, an appropriate solution
may lie in finding an optimal degree of regulation that balances this cost of deregulation
(in terms of social welfare motivated objective) and the cost of regulation (in terms of
corruption). A part of the solution may also include a better understanding of what may
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represent the optimal type of regulation. For example, price-based regulations may cause
lesser corruption in comparison to quantity based regulation because of the different rent
structures that these regulations create. As Lambsdorff (2007) explains that government
intervention alone may not be adequate but sound quality of government regulation is
what is necessary to mitigate corruption. Apart from these, institutions that influence
implementations of regulation may also play a vital role. To this end, some researchers
propose to reduce discretionary power that bureaucrats enjoy overall (Apergis et al. 2012,
Duvanova 2014). In contrast, if regulation turns out to reduce socially inferior outcomes
like corruption, then restricting discretion of government personnel may be counterproductive (see Djankov et al. 2002).
However, all of these possibilities become irrelevant from a policy
perspective of curbing corruption if there is no evidence of a causal link between corruption
and regulation. In this case, researchers ought to shift their focus to other reasonable
determinants of corruption and corresponding anti-corruption policies, thereby discarding
regulation to be a plausible cause and disproving the standard conjecture. But to attain
any of these, it is essential to first identify the causal relationship.
Using corruption conviction data from the PIN and a novel federal-level
industry specific regulation dataset (Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin 2015), I evaluate the
causal impact of government regulation on bureaucratic corruption across U.S. states for
the time period 1990-2013. I circumvent the two major econometric challenges associated
with such an empirical analysis by applying state-of-the-art econometric techniques. To
mention briefly, bureaucratic corruption suffers from a one-sided measurement error
problem due to strict under-representation of ‘true’' corruption level. Government
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regulation is also not strictly exogeneous in the current context. I address the first issue
by explicitly modeling the one-sided measurement error via a stochastic frontier approach
(e.g., Millimet 2017). In absence of a traditional instrumental variable, I control for the
potential endogeneity of regulation via the Lewbel (2012) identification strategy (e.g.,
Choudhury 2015). Application of these strategies are accompanied with elaborate intuitive
explanation in the current context.
Strikingly, I find evidence of no causal effect of regulation on corruption on
controlling for both the econometric issues in the analysis. However, if any of these two
issues are ignored, then the naive estimation strategies indicate government regulation to
have statistically significant impact on bureaucratic corruption across U.S. states.
Furthermore, conflicting signs associated with these estimates confound such evidence of
a spurious relationship to a greater extent.
To conclude, I believe my analysis provides the first credible investigation
of the causal impact of government regulation on corruption. While several additional
examinations are called for in the near future --- e.g., potential heterogeneous effects and
plausible greater preference for lobbying in the U.S. over bribery --- at the very least, my
findings ought to draw attention of researchers to the importance of being cautious about
pertinent econometric issues in an empirical study and accounting for these while
conducting a causal analysis.
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APPENDIX

CHAPTER 2

Table A1. Data Sources and Summary Statistics
Source

N

Mean

SD

World Business Environment Survey (WBES, 1999-2000)

8952

0.306

0.461

0

1

WTO Membership in 1999 (1 = Yes)
WTO Membership after 1999
Conditional on Being a Nonmember in
1999 (1 = Yes)
Monotone Instrumental Variable

http://www.stanford.edu/~tomz/pubs/pubs.shtml

8952
2374

0.735
0.777

0.441
0.417

0
0

1
1

GDP Per Capita

World Development Indicators, The World Bank (1999)

8952

7593.700 7531.715

World Business Environment Survey (WBES, 1999-2000)
Djankov et al. (2004)

7227
8812

1980.223
0.727

25.611
1.283

1400
0.005

1999
5.348

Djankov et al. (2004)

8812

11.632

3.811

2.000

21.000

Number of Days to Start a Business, 1999 Djankov et al. (2004)
FDI Net Inflows (% of GDP)
World Development Indicators, The World Bank (1999)

8812

58.695

35.396

2.000

260.000

8952

3.953

3.804

-1.333

22.384

FDI Net Outflows (% of GDP)

World Development Indicators, The World Bank (1999)

8219

1.591

3.953

-1.390

30.329

Firm Ownership (1 = Government)

World Business Environment Survey (WBES, 1999-2000)

0.117

0.321

0

1

Exporting Firm (1 = Yes)

World Business Environment Survey (WBES, 1999-2000)

8631
8489

0.361

0.480

0

1

Variable

Minimum Maximum

Outcome Indicator
Honesty/Absence of Coruption: Bribe
paid (1 = Never)
Treatment Indicators

Covariates
Firm Age (Year of Establishment)
Costs of Starting a Business (% of
income per capita), 1999
Number of Procedures to Start a
Business, 1999

https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/or
g6_e.htm
468.426 37283.810

Notes: GDP per capita is in PPP units (current international dollars). For countries where entry regulation measures are missing for 1999, we use data from
2004 from the World Bank's Doing Business database. For countries where FDI data are missing for 1999, we use the nearest available year.
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Table A2. Sample Breakdown by Formal WTO Membership Status, 1999
Country
Not Formal WTO Members
Albania#
Armenia#
Azerbaijan*
Belarus*
Bosnia*
Cambodia#
Croatia#
Ethiopia*
Georgia#
Kazakhstan#
Lithuania#
Moldova#
Russia#
Ukraine#
Uzbekistan*
Total

N
152
119
118
120
89
324
124
87
114
114
95
114
470
218
116
2,374

Country

N

Formal WTO Members
Bangladesh
Belize
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cote d'lvoire
Czech Rep
Dominican Rep
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
France
Germany
Ghana
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Italy
Kenya
Kyrgizstan
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mexico

49
46
97
93
189
117
48
95
98
98
98
78
118
110
96
96
102
124
79
86
101
102
99
79
112
204
99
91
106
104
105
53
88
98

Country
Namibia
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Pakistan
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Senegal
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Tanzania
Thailand
Trinidad&Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
UK
US
Uganda
Uruguay
Venezuela
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Total

N
89
92
82
101
97
103
100
202
89
116
79
99
104
117
116
95
101
75
422
94
38
128
97
93
122
82
96
74
117
6,578

Notes: * indicates countries that currently have observer status in the WTO. # indicates countries that became formal
members of the WTO after 1999.
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CHAPTER 3

Table A1: Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable
Definition

Source

Bureaucratic Corruption

Total number of convictions of public
officials per 1000 government
employees.

Convictions of public officials: Public Integrity Section
(https://www.justice.gov/criminal/pin). Full time equivalent government
employment: US Census Bureau
(https://www.census.gov/govs/apes/historical_data_2013.html).
Regulation: RegData (Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin 2015, http://regdata.org/).
Industry-level employment: Quaterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW),
Bureau of Labor Statistics
(https://www.bls.gov/cew/datatoc.htm#NAICS_BASED). Concordances: Census
Bureau, 2007 NAICS
(https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/concordances.html).

Regulation

Weighted average of federal regulation
of industries. Time invariant weights are
given by share of industrial employment
to total employment in a state with 1990
as the base period.

Income (in dollars)

Real per capita personal income.

Per capita personal income: Bureau of Economic Analysis
(https://www.bea.gov/regional/downloadzip.cfm). Consumer Price Index for all
urban consumers (CPIU): FRED
(https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CPIAUCSL).

Ideology

Citizen Ideology: 0 (Conservative) - 100
(Liberal).

Revised 1960-2013 citizen ideology series: Berry et al. 1998, "Measuring Citizen
and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93," American Journal of
Political Science , 42:327-48.

Income Inequality

Gini Coefficient.

Frank, Mark. W. 2014 "A New State-Level Panel of Annual Inequality Measures
over the Period 1916 - 2005" Journal of Business Strategies , vol. 31, no. 1, pages
241-263 (http://www.shsu.edu/eco_mwf/inequality.html).

Education

High school graduates and above:
percent of the total population 25 years
and over with a high school diploma or
higher.

US Census Bureau (Decennial census of population, 1990 - 2000; American
Community Survey, 2005 - 2013).

Unemployment (in hundreds)

Unemployment among civilian
noninstitutional population.

Bureau of Labor Statistics: Employment status of the civilian noninstitutional
population, annual averages.

Centralization

Centralization of government power:
share of state government's expenditure
in total expenditure by state and local
governments.

US Census Bureau: State and Local Government Finance.

Government Size (in dollars)

Real per capita government revenue.

Government Revenue: US Census Bureau (State and Local Government Finance).
Population: US Census Bureau (Intercensal estimates of the total resident
population of states, https://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/ US).
Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers (CPIU): FRED
(https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CPIAUCSL).

Divided Government

Government is divided if legislature and
executive branch are led by two
different parties. 1 = Yes, 0 = No.

State Legislature: Wikipedia (e.g.,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Alabama). Executive Composition
(Governor's party): Wikipedia (e.g.,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Governors_of_Alabama).

Urbanization (in thousands)

Share of urban population in total population.

Urban population: US Census Bureau (Urban and Rural Classification and Urban
Area Criteria). Population: US Census Bureau (Intercensal estimates of the total
resident population of states, https://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/ US).

Notes: For constructing bureaucratic corruption, convictions of (t+1) year is used as a proxy for corruption in the year t for all specifications, except for robustness check
(see Table 4 for details). For constructing regulation variable, industry-level employment of the year 1990 from QCEW is used which is as per the NAICS 2002 code.
This was converted to NAICS 2007 coding system to make it comparable to RegData which is as per NAICS 2007. For randomly missing variables for a year (e.g.,
government employment, government expenditure and government revenue), average of previous and following years are taken. For variables like Urban Population and
High school graduates and higher (1990 - 2004), census counts are used. For non-censal years, linear interpolation method is used. For High school graduates and higher
for years 2005 - 2013, annual estimates from American Community Survey are used. For population, census data are used as of the month, April. For non-censal years,
intercensal estimates as of the date July 1 are used.
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